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I This study examines the provision of thiro_ty liability
I insurance by the Federal C_verrment to o0mmercial users of space.
It is assumed that the nation has 4_cided that it is in the
national interest to c]evelopthe space frontier and te make
ommercial use of this frontier. The nation has also decided
that it is in the best interest of the peoples of the earth and
7 the private organizations engaged in commercial space activities
that space activities be insured a_""inst third-party liability
W"
[ in the amount of $500 million individually (single payload), or
_ $750 million collectively (multiF?epayloads) when launched by a
' single flight of the Space Shuttle.
_ , _he purpose of a requirement for third-fatty liability
.' insurance is twofold: (i) in the event of a loss, it ensures
that those suffering the loss will receive some c(m_m_nsation,and
(2) it protects the private entity conducting the space activity
against catastroft/c liability loss, thus improving the chance of
i continuation of an otherwise beneficial space activity aftec a
i mishap. Given that the determination has been made r/_at
commercial spece development is in the national good, the Federal
- Government may choose to provide third-party liability insuranee
to certain space users when such insurance is not otherwise
; available from c(mmercial insurance sourees at a "reasonable"
price. Such provision may be made when it is determined that a
I space activity is in the natienal interest. Criteria rec(mmmmded
[ _ for this determination are as follows:
[ 1 ,
198GOO37G2-OOG
- I 1. _e activity c]oes not £uExNse undue risk to persons or
property on earth or in spsce.
2. The activity does not adversely Im[mct the environment,
nor does it impose undue risk to the envirm1_nt, either
i on the earth or in s_ace.
3. The activity,is not in violation of international law or
treaties to which t_ United States is a signatory, i
[ 4. The activity is not in violation of domestic law or the |
_ Constitution.
i 5. The activity does not threaten national security, nor
_- does it impose undue risk to Gove_t property, nor|
does it seek to overthrow the Government by force.
! 6. The activity does not infringe on basic human rights.
It is rec(mmended that (with respect to the provision of
, third party liability insurance) determanation of whether a space
activity is in the national interest not incl_ e measures of the
economic or financial worth of the activity insofar as such
determination would be subject to a variety of imperfections, and
"l may not be adequately made by an agent of the Federal Government,
$
as opposed to a member of the sponsoring organization. It should
be noted that the current JEA progran does not require measures
of economic or financial worth.
.. If the Federal Government chooses to provide third-party
liability insurance to those space users that meet criteria such
!
as the above, a determination of "reasonable" premiums must be
made, and a structure for Federally provided insurance must be
established. Determination of reasonability of rates is both
#-
L _ difficult and subjective. From the point of view of the user,
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I
the most reasonable rate is zero. Any payment htc_er than this
I is les_ reasormble. Surely another measure is necessary. Three
possible measures are (1) historical rates, (2) the cost of
I alternatives, and (3) the financialimpacton an activity, k
i common determination of the reasonabilityof a price is a
ccmpazis(m of the price to historicalPrioesfor the same good.
I If the price has remainedrelativelyconstant, mu_t willb ,rs
oonsider it mreasonable,m Anothermeasureof reasonablenessis
I the compazisonof alternatives. Any price for insuranoewould be
ommidered unreasonableif, for example, a comparablelaunchon
Ariane sans ir._urancerequirements,were availableat a lower
i" cost than a launchon the Space Shuttle. FL-a/ly,reasonability
could be definedin terms of the ultimateeffect of insurance
! costs on the rateof space commercialization. No doubt, higher
_- costs will impedethe conductof otherwisemarginal activities.
But, given the currentrates_the impactof thiseffectcould be
quite small, unlesspricesincreasedrastically. None of these
. measuresis totallysatisfying,nor is therea basis for choosing ,
-g
4
o one over the others. _hus, reasonabilityof premiumsis largely
i subjective.
Unfortunately,the case for _easonabilityfromthe point of
not much better. For riskssuch as lifeview of the insurersis
insurance.,actuarialdat_ can be used to determinereasonability.
I But inadequatedata are availablefor thismethodof determining
I "reasonable"premiums for third-partyliability insurance for
commercialsl_aceactivities. In this case, the best measureof
[
1 m
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I practice in the s_--b_suran_ area with "standard practi_"
other oa_ments of the industry. The key consideration in making
this cz_oar._on is the manner in which insured risks are
diversified. It is apparent that space-liabillty risks are
diversified in a manner that is quite favorable to the insured,
in _iscn to other areas of insurance. Thus, using the
criteria of standard practice, current slmsm-liabilitypremiums
! 1:
appear quite :easonable. And using historical rates as a oasis !_
for judging reasonability from the point of view of the user, it
could be said that the premiums will remain reasonable if they do
not lncrease significantly.
Insurance serves the purpose of diversifying risks.
Expected liability takes into account the likelihood of events
and their potent1_l magnitudes. It is the average liability over
a large number of trials. Estimating an expected liability
precisely is very difficult, but approFriate calculations can be
done using relatively simple models, a-d, from such a model, it
appears that the _ liability that the entire Space Shuttle
i fleet will generate over its lifetime is less than $500,000. : ..a"
Conse_m_ntly, it is highly likely, but not certain, that premiums
I on the order of $i00,000 insured activity--approzimatelytheper
current rate--wi/l provide an adequate set aside for liability
I claims that may arise. However, expected value is only a
i statistical measure, it is only achieved over a large number of
events. Liability damages will either be 0 or high, but since
I probabilities associated with an accident causing damages
are
extremely low, the expected liability is small.
] 986003762-009
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calculated, is higher t'.r the expected liability that the
I insured activity would generate. The exoess between the prm_ium
and the expected liability provides for overhead, profits, "_s,
I etc. of the insurers, and it provides a _mhi_ _ _gain.
I statistical variations from averages. The maximum liability that
a space activity cc_id conceivably generate is eq_l to the :?<ce
7-
! value of the insurance policy (typically $500 Or $750 rillion).
Ovei"time, insurers must set aside a sum of money that could make°
such a payment if required. One method of setting a premium,
j when insufficient actuarial data is available, is to choose that
premium that would set aside enough revenues to cover a maximum
i liability event within a reasonable period of time--typically 1
to 5 years.
These considerations of reasonabilityprovide the basis of a
structure for the provision of third-pazty liability insurance by
the Federal Goverrmm_nt. SiI_:eany test for reasonableness is
arbitral] (from insurer's Point of view reasonablenessmay imply
increases in pr_mLitm_sfrom the current $I00,000 level to $500,000
to $I million, in order to maintain a reasonable relationship
with other forms of liability insurance), an alternative to avoid
such a test would be for the Federal Government to provide
Federal insurance at a rate s(m_Mmt above what is likely to be
enommtered in the free market. This could erasurethat insurance
- will be available and at a reasonable rate, if not on the private
[ market, then from the government. It is suggested that such a
structure seek to accomplish the following objectives:
[ _=L-_-- 1. It s_ould not present ._nimpediment to commercial space /tJ
1986003762-010
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I activities, rather it . Id complement t/_m.
2. Its conditions should I,x)tbe subject to interpretation
or negotiation.
3. It should not interfere with the provision of third-l_rty liability insurance from commercial insuranoe
4. It should not impose a burd_.non the ,nited States
L
suggested for the provision of third-party liability insur_
i by the Federal Government and should be studied further.
i. Establish a Space Liability Trust Fund that is
independentof the General Fund, and which receives
- monies from premiums psid, those monies proviolng for
management of the Fund and liability payments that,
I be bytheFund.
2. Provide for qualified space users to purchase th J-
| party liability insurance from the Fund at a price esta-
blished by the Fund, and set so as not to _r po- .
1 tentiad spaoe activiti__snor to inhibit the continued
1 provision of such insurance from commercial sources.
3. Establish a premitrnschedule in advanoe of sales, such
I premiums to apply for a period of at least one year.
Premiums shottldnot be subject to negotiation, but they
could be subject to revision on a yearly basis, as dic-
rated by actuarial data.
4. Establish a prem/,_ schedule that is tied to the launch
[ _ fee. For e2_mple, for Space Shuttle flights, the pre- _ ,
1986003762-011
mium om_Id be I _rcent of the launch fee. The exact
percentage could be adJuste_ perlodlcally, if necessary.
By pruportimti,_ the insurance premium to the launch fee,
the Fund acknowledges that small payloadswould not be as likely
large payloads to contribute to potential mishaps. Further,
the premium burden would be shared by the Space S_,ttle users
- according to theiL "u__" of the Space Shuttle. h_d such a
premium structure would not impose an undue burden on small
payloads that are likely t¢ much smaller financialrepresent
investments than large payloads. _be use of the launch fee as a
_ parameter for determining premium_ is simple and objective: it
accounts for size and mass of the p_/l. , and it is an easily
determined parameter that is readily available to the _ederal
Government.
If a trus+ fund is set up in accordance with the above
structure, it could assure that all potential space users would
have aocess to third-party liability insuranoe at a price that
does not unduly inhibit cummercial space activities. It could,
therefore, remove this potential barrier to commercial space
"i
I"
activities. On _/_e other hand, it wou!_ not prevent the
i:_urance industry from continuing to provide such insurance to
the limit of its capacity to do so, at rates comparable to
current rates, or higher if actuarial data indicate. Finally,
4
9iven a rate structure wherein premitms exceed those currently
charged by commercial insuranoe souroes, it is extremely unlikely
-._ that such a fund would impose a burdep on the United States
1986003762-012
I. _ON
In 1972 the United States became a party to the U.N.
"Co_vention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects."[l] The treaty provides that the launching state of a
:i space object, that is, the st_ _ from who6e territories a space
c_ject is launched, xs absolute/y* liable for any damage caused "
to any other state by the object. R3 14-,titis placed _ this
liability. Without a liability limit, _ivate enterprise would
hesitate to make use of space. Thus, to promote commerciad Slmoe
activities, the Federal Go_,ernmenthas agreed to indemnify all
space users against liabilit/es exceeding $500 million. _be
fizst $500 million of liability has, however, remained an issue.
Since the late 1970's, the National Aeronautics eu_ Space
_ministraticn (_ZA) has required users of space vehicles to
obtain insurance to protect 'the Federal Govermmmt frua potential
i tort liability resulting frum injury to third ,rties (those no_
a party _o the launch agreement).[2] Initially, the required
level of insuranoe set at the amount that available from
was was q_
private sources.[1] Users of expendable launch vehicles ha_e
been able to procure liability insurance in amounts up to $500
I million per launch. More recent/y, _r, for payloads carried
aboard the .C_aceShuttle, difficulties have been experienced in
J obtaining thxs amount of insurance when the_e have been two
or
more payloads _n the same flight because the required insurance
I capacity of $I billion or more ($500million per peyload) has not
I _ " "Absolute" liability means that there isnoneedtoproVefau t.
8 ,
-f,
1986003762-013
I
!
alwaysbeen available. (Flightahave been insuredfor up to $1.5
I billion,[2]but there have been ptt_lems in findingrecently
|: sufficient capacity to insureup to $i.0billion per flight.)
i_! Faced with the unavailabilityof insuranoe, the g_verrme-t
_ chooseone of fourcoursesof action:
I. Continueto requireall SpaceShuttleusers to purchase
_; $500 million 'third-partyliability insurance ($750
:_ millioncombinedtotalper flight).
_ _ 2. Waive the insurance requirement under certain
f_
_ circumstances,sucha_ when it is u_available,or not
availableunder reasonabletermsand cot_litionsor for
reasonableprc_nium_.
3. Provideinsurance,backedb_ the FederalGovernment, to
_ those users thatcannotor choosenot to obtainit from
commercialsources.
4. Perform added research and developmentto make the
system "safer,"and to demonstratesuch"_afety,so that
insur_,%oewill be more readilyavailable.
Insofaras insurancemight not be availableto all potential
spaceusers,the first optioncouldimposea significantdostacle
to commercialspace activities. Zven if insurance is usually
available, the threat of its unavailabilitycould impose
. . unacceptable risks to some commercial space activities.
Implementationof the secondolxjon could createincentives for
, privateindustryto try to failto obtaininsurance,and it would
_.: not provideany compensationto the Goverrmemtto cover potential
._ [ _ losses. Tnis option would alsocreate the [:x:_=_ibilityof a "_ ,_,
,¢
, ).
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lencg_ approval process. _ ._ve_ _'uld have to decide
1 whether terms and conditions and premimm _re "reasonmbie."L
Th
Measures of ceason_leness are, as wG.l be c]i_'_msed,
t u_atisfactory,and dependon the user. A reasonable premium for
. |, Oomsat may not be reasonable for SBS or Kicrogravity Research
, Associates. The c_vermmmt would have to continuallysurly the
| price and availability of insurance. The third option places the
Gove_t intothe L%suram_ businessbut, ifdone with care, _
could meet the desired criteria. This course of actian would
@
;_ exposethe Governmentto substantialpotential liabilities,but
,_ _ not more than the second option, and some ecmpensaticnwould be.
provided. If structured carefully, Federally prcwided insurance
• would be available as a back-up to private insurance, and not in
.J . c(m_etition with it. This _xtld ensure that adequate insurance
_. ] is always available for a reasonable premitm, if not from the
private sector then from the govenmm.nt. The final option is not
] really viable. _he cost of researc and development to
dmwx_trate improved reliability of the Space Shuttle would
', ] undoubtedly be more than the maximum liability that could o_
%
-: | if the Gove_t indemnified all users against all liability|
losses.
"_I By _ authority provided in Section 308 (1979) of the
Nati(mal _eronautics and Space _ of 1958, the NASA
h_ministrator may "provide liability insurance for any _ser of a
I space vehicle to oampensate all or a portion of claims by third
parties for damage resulting from activities carried on in
I _ e°nnecticn with the launch' °perati°ns°r rec°very°f a space
]986003762-0 ] 5
i_" [ vehicle." _he users are to EeJztmrse the _min/straLton to the
II
maximumextent "practicable" for this insurance. Subsection {b)
I of Section 308 states that, "taking into accost the
availability,cost and terms of liabilityirmurm_ce,any
(
agreement between the k]mlnistratlcnand a space vehicle user may
T provide that the United States will indemnify the user against
third r_rty liaSilJty c!_ir_ resulting from activities carried on
. in ca_ecti(m with the launch, operations or recovery of the
, _- spaoe vehicle to the extent that the claims are not compensated
'_ by the liability_suranceof theuser.'[3]
Section 308 was i_plemented _nder Executive Order No. 12291,
., a n_nmajor, final regulation titled "Insurance and
Indemnification of NASA Spaoe Vehicle Users (14 CFR Part 1214
: Subpazt 1214.13).'[4] The regulation states that all users of a
NASA space vehicle, with the exception of t_hose flying small
self-contained payloads, and users providing payload specialist
services for NASA missions must obtain insurance protecting
themselves, the U.S. government, and other parties identified in
the launch agre_m.nt. E_w_ver, this insuranoe requirement may be
waived for a particular user or flight if it is determined that
-'-_ acti_ is in the "public interest." The amount of insurance
and the terms and c(mditicns of insurance must be agreed to by
NASA and the user, taking into consideration the insurance
available in the world market at a "reasonable premium." If NASA
determines that adequate third party liability insurance is not
available on reasonable ter.s or at a reasonable
and g-,
, premium on the private market, o_ that _e availablility of
. I _ ir_sur-- prevents an or_rly ar_ eguitable alloc_tio_ of
i , #
Ii 't
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,I
I liability risk, _ will pr_ide adequate liability protection
i for users and the u.s, _erme_. [5]
Recent discussions between NASA and the Office of Management
i and Buckjet[4] have stressed the _ed for 1_ to further define
its insuranoe-related role and clarify the conditions under
which it will indemnify or provide Federal insurance for space
6
1 vehicleusers,and the potentialra_/tude of the U.S. Treasury's
-; liabilityif Federalinsuranceis provided.
q
i The objective of this study is to:provide information to
!I support decisions concerning the provision by the Federal
Government of third-party liability insurance for c_merclal
space activities. The practices associated with third-partyi
liability insuranee in the marine, aviation, and electric
,'_ utility (nuclear power) i_]ustries in addition to those
industries associated with spacemissionshave been reviewed.
Results of this review are presented in Section 2. Theoretical
considerations of rate setting are discussed Ln Section 3 and a
methodology to "_termine the period of time ever which the
insurers of each industry intend to set aside reserves to recover ":
frQm a maximum liability loss should one occur is introduced.
_ " Data have been developed (Section 4) for the above industries,
-!
including premiums, claim statistics, annual revenue generated
_i and payouts, and industry, assets relating to the ability to
: insure. Tn_ data were analyzed (Section 4) _o determh_e the set-
i aside period in each industry, and to suggest standards of
L
reasonableness from the insurer's point of view. Criteria for
]" Federal provision of insurance are discussed in Section 5, which
986003762-0J7
9I presents public interestarguments, an Interl_tatloa of the
P_i_rson Act, deteraina_s of the availability of
I commercialinsurar_e, potentialinsurerliability, and measures
I of reasonablenessfor premiumratesfrom the user's point cf
view. Section 6 presentsoptionsavailableto the government
I regarding thir_ party liability protection. Cmv.lusi_.s and
i __ations are provick_in section7.
[
[
[
!
/
]
i
]
1
I
[
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2. LIABILIT_ _ IN _ II_iXJ_ES
I A review of _ac_Aces associated with third party liability
T insurance in t/_ nuclear power, marine, aviation, and space
industries is presented.
, Nuclear power has associated N_zards that have
7 characteristics unlike most other hazards and related potential
losses that are covered by insurance policies. %'heprobabillt3_of
occurrence and the Earimum possible magnitude of damages is
unknown. In the worst possible case the losses could be
_. • catastrophic. In the late 1950's, the Nuclear Regulatory
- Cmmission concluded that hypVchetical property dsmm.le fram a
nuclear incident might range from half a million dollars to a
worse case limit of $7 billion. The latter figure would be due
. mostly to contamination of land with fissionable products.[l]
• Later studies estimated damages far greater. For instance,
" according to NRC's Reactor Safety Study [1975], damages fram a
major accident could reach $17 billion.[2] Although the
pr_bility of oocurrenoe of such catastrophic nuclear
incidents[l] is thought to be extremely low (one study esti._t._-d
the p_(f_bility of a serious nuclear plant aocident to be as low
I as one chance in a billion reactor o_erating years[3]), it is
desirable that insurance be available to provide for such an
I eventuality. A unique system of setting aside funds for the
_ remote possibility of a large financial loss has been established
,o
W
-- I
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_ I _he Price-Anderson _ct of 1957 amended the Atomic Energy A.-t
_ of 1954. The Act was intended to apply only to licenses issued
[ tluough 1967, but was twi_ extended to apply to licenses issued
" I throLgh 1977 and then through 1987. Major objectives of the
'_' Price-,_erson Act were (i) to overcame industry reluctance to
I"i partici_%te in nuclear power generation due to fear of the
possibility of catastrc_c, uninsured claims from a nuclear
aocident and (2) to avoid delay or failure to provide
i _tion to Uhe public in the event of a nuclear incident
!
[5]. Price-Anderson protects the public i£ an incident were to
'" i occur by assuring the availability of funds to satisfy public
_ _ liability claims. [3_j Price-Anderson raquires a nuclear power reactor operator to _
.. ] _mnit proof of financial protection, covering liability claims
for bodily injury or prt_erty damage losses caused by nuclear
i'" I materials,[6] to the Nuclear Regulatory Cumnission (NRC) before
he can receive an operating license. Financial protection may
| 'be supplied through "private insurance, private contractual
: I Lndemnities, self-insurance, other proof of financial
responsibility or a combination'[7] of the above. Electric
"_ I utilities that choose to purchase insurance are required to buy
all nuclear liability insurau_e that is available from private
u.ero,
I protection.[4] Initially the maximum amount of private insurance
I
-" available per facility was $60 mi!lioni over time, it has risen
l to $160 million--the maximau applied to production facilities _
I
-t' '
e
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having a rated capacity of at least I00,000 kilowatts.[8]
To a_te, each nuclear o_rator has elected to pJrclmse a
liability policy from one of two Insuranoe pools. _he ammmt of
financial protection required and the fee for _K_vernment
indmm_ty are based on authorized operating levels of thermal
[8] In 1957, when the version of the _ct was_r. original
passed, liability insurance in the private market was $60 minion
and the government agreed to be liable for $500 million[3,9].
The rationale behind the $500 million _imitation on gove_t
indemnification was that $500 million would not significantly
disturb the Federal budget. [10] The Act limited each nuclear
- facility's maxim,,,,liability to $560 million: the amount then
- available from the private market plus the $500 million the
" government would indemnify in case of loss exceeding private
market capacity. The $500 million limitation on government
indemnification, Congress agreed, could be suuject to upward
. revision in any particular incident, if after further
!
oongressiunal study Congress decided more appropriations were in
order. Changes in the _ would be considered by Congress in "_
light of the particular incident.[I]
_his was the first time that any such protection had been
offered by the Federal govenmmmt for any particular industrial
hazard and the amount of protection it allowed was unprecedented
in the history of liability insurance covering a commercial
activity.[8] Reactor operators had to pay an arml_l fee to the
I government for this extra protection from the government.[ii,6]
During the years that the Act has been in force the government
I _ has c°llected $21 milli°n in indemzity fees'[9] Industry _ "
1986003762-021
coverage under private insurers grLw to $160 million per facility
r by 1979. [121
m
"%e maximum amour of liabiiit¥ insurance available per
nuclear incident is shown in Table 2.1 for the period 1957-1982.
In an analysis of the Price-Anderson Act, the General Accounting
Office spoke with representatives of the nuclea_ pools to gain an
understanding of the basis for available liability ouverage a_
the possibility of increasing the ooverage. Pool representatives
stressed that coverage is based on each "cumpany'swillin%/ess to
invest its money in nuclear, insurance, and not on any actuarial
basis. EVen the Three Mile Island accident did not prcwi,_e
enough data for an actuarial base. In the absence of any type of
actuarial base, various insurance companies are forced to make
[ decisions regarding nuclear power versus other investments where
i. the actuarial base is better known and the profit potential isbetter. Pool representatives felt that even if premiums were
raised substantially, insurance capacity would not be
_g&BLE2.1 HISTO_X OF MAXIMUM LIABILITY CU4EP/K_EAVA_ABIR
.: FRCR THE NU(X.?ARPOC[_ (TH_ GF CURRENT YKKRL
 LLA S)
! YEAR LI_ILrrY _
1957-65 $ 60,000
1966-68 $ 74,000
I 1969 $ 82,0001970-71 $ 82,000
1972-73 $ 95,000
1974 $110,000
I 1975-76 $125 0001977-78 $140,000
1979-84 $160,000
_1 17
_
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increased. [10]
maximum limitation on liability has remained fixed in
current year dollars (it re_ntly reached $585 million with the
i growth of a _ level of insuranoe, whichwill be ex_atnad
below). _us, using the oonsumer prioe index $560 mLUlon in
I 1957 dollars translates into $1.8 billion 1982 dollars.
Similarly, the $60 million LTivate Insuranoe, available in 1957 .
_mld have a value of $200 million in 1982 dollars. Thus, the
"- actual value of insurance has been reduced (in constant dollars
T
I
relative to 1957) by a factor of approximately 3 to 4.
j _t amendments modified the Price-Anderson Act. A
m
1966 amendment stipulated that insurance claims be made on a no-T
!
fault basis. Under this provision the liability protection of the
"_ nuclear plant covers claims against any other individual who
,, might be lJ_le under ordinary tort law principles, such as
architects, engineers, contractors and suppliers.[13] The nt_lear
. operator waives almost all legal defenses in incidents determined
- by the Atomic Energy Ommission (AEC)to be an extraordinary
nuclear occurrenoe (ENO). Limiting the waiver to _O's would
prevent the filing of small spurious claims and nuisance suitJs
against nuclear reactor operators. An ENO was defined in the
amendment to be an event'causing a discharge or dispersal of
l souree, special nuclear, or by-product material from its intended
l place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation
levels offsite, which the Commission determines to be substantial
l and which the Commission determines has resulted or probably will
result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property
l _ °ffsite'"[8] _
"%
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I This "channeling" of responsibility for liability claim is
I intended to simplify and speed the claim process. Claimants Qnly
have to prove personal injury or property dmage_ were caused
I from radioactive materials released in a nuclear incident and
show mcmetary mount of foes, but they do not have to establish
the nuclear plant owner's llability.[6,8,9] This ensures the
public will be able to establish liability for a nuclear accident
which will be backed by solid financial resouroes and all(_asthe
insurance industry the stable premium _se required to spread
v the risk of a nuclear disaster _er an extended time period.[12]
i
If a number of potential defendants had to have liability
insurance, the total amotmt of insurance would be spread out
among many potential defendants. In the case.of a ju_jement
. agair_t any one of them there would be a reduced amount of
- insurance available for paymsnt of claims than would otherwise be
the case.[13] Consistent with the no-fault provision, standard
property and liability policies such as automobile, humeuwners
and cu,mercial property and liability policies contain
l :exclusions or limitations on losses st_ from radiation
., j hazards.[8] The amendment also stated that g_verrment _ty
!
would be reduced to the extent that private financial protection
! | _re_ed _ _6omi.uion.[91
{
L
Another amrndment in 1.975 required the creation of a
I secondary level of financial protection that would be provided
I through payments of retro6pectivepremiums ($5 million per large
operating reactor) whet._ and if a nuclear catastrophy occurred at
I _ °he of the plants that exhausted the primary level °f financial _
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[ protection.[5] In the event of a nuclear accident causing
lisbility _mqes in excessof $160zillion, each operator_ a
I' nuclearplantwill be billedby the nuclear pools (nuclear pools 4
- are discussedbelow)up to $5 millionfor each incidentfor each
i
reactor (not to exceed $10 million for each reactor in a calendar
: year). The int.e_:ionwas to phase out goverrment _Ioat.tono
[Ii]and thishas ectuallyoccurredas the financial protection
r_w available from private souroes is $585 million ($160 million
primary and $425millionsecondary- 85 pm_r plantsprovide $5
million each of retrospective premium). [12,14] Under *.he
_ amendment the maximum liability limit floats uIward £o meet the
amount of protection '_x)thprimary and sec(mdary available from
private sources[6] (from $560 million to $585 million). If
losses should ever exceed the maximum limit on liability,
Congress has obligated itself to review the situation and take
appropriate action to pr.-t_ct the public. [4,6]
i
Most insuranoe practices operate by "spreading the risk" or
distributing the large losse_ of a few to a large number of
insureds who each pay a small prec_ium. [15] This "interpersonal
loss spreadi.ng" works w_ll when accidents are common to a large
number and the size of loss is moderate. The. probability Of a
nuclear oatastroi_y are very low yet the potential damages if one
i does occur are extremely high. [12] Nuclear liability insuran¢_
uses the technique of "intertemporalloss spreading" which,
rather than spreading the risk over individuals spreads the risk
I over time. Intertemporal loss spreading involves spreading ove_
[" several accounting periods the impact of a large loss that m/ght
"_- I _ take placeinaparticular year.[3]
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! The capacity to underwrite ..ch a loss must be available,
%
i T but is beyond the means of any single ir_urance _. [3,6]
_ Nuclear risks are conoentrated &. pooled and the i_u,ance
L *
_ insures the entire nuclear industry.[12] II1 or6er to
fulfil/ its licensing requirement each nuclear facility has
:_ • purchased a liabi]_ty policy fr(m the nuclear Insura_ [xx_is,[6]
as mentioned above. Pools are gE(X_S Of insurance oc_es that
•' combine resources to allow them to insure risks of a size that
-!
_! .: would be beyond the capacit_ of any sing1"efirm [II]
;i _,o pools pr_ide nuclear energy insuramee --the _merican
• Nuclear L_urers (ANI) and the Mutual Atcmic Energy Reinsurance
_ . Pool (MAERP).[3,6,16] Liability insurance is underwritten by
_, (which also underwrites property insurance), and w_ich counts
h_
"" I_0 insuranoe companies as members,[17] and the Mutual Atomic
Energy Liability Underwriters (MAELU)which is affiliated with
f _ _ consists of six member companiesof MAERP. [3,5,6r16]
'f Two px_is were established in 1957: MAERP was organi_ed as a
u
_* mutual corporation and the Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance
"I
" Ass(x:iati_ (which eventually became ANI-after consolidation with "
,-;. the NUclear Energy Liability-Property Insurance Association and "
- subsequent name chan_)was organized as a stock corporation.
. ] _lI operates five separate nuclear pools c_e;irg nuclear
' property and liability insurance inside and out of the U.S. As
I of September 1982, 112 ANI Ir,a_ber c_Janies participated in the
nuclear liability pool.[5]
I The pools use identical policy forms, rates and rating
I _ procedures and carry (x,tinspection of risks and hand/ing of _ ,
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i claims Jointly. [81 O_sistently TT._ of coveragehas cure fran
NqI and 22.5_ from _ sources for both primry and _ry
-!
coverages. [51 Porelgnuclear insurance compan/es reh_ure about
" Under the IndustryCredit RatingPlan,the pools providefor
I retrospectivedownwardadj_ of premiumsten years after
:_,, ] lmyment. Seventy percent of each annual liability premium is set " ,"
aside in a reserve fund to be used for loss or lo;.s expem_ !
_ayments. After ten years a 2ortion of the.funds not used to pay
_. losses are refundedto the insureds. The Plan was developed
-. premiu_ ratesoz any reservefund to supportthe insured risk.
-_ Table 2.2 indicates the amount of refunds made to the nuclear
_- industry and t_ percent of premium income the refund
represents.[8,19]
__ _ In 1984 the maxim_n liability coverage available fram the
;,;] nuclear pools is $160 millio_,for each insured facility (there
are currently 85 facilities),[8,12] The ooverage available frum
] 'the pools is the primarylevel of prutectionand is supplemented ";:
by a _ry level of pr_cection which is furnished, by the
_. operatorsof nuclearpower plantsunder the retrospectivepr_d_
1 plan as noted above.[3,12] This retrospective rating plan is
provided under a basic policy issl_d by the nuclear pools that
i covers "excess losses," defined as losseE from,bodily injury or
:. property damage in excess of _ paid or payable under all
I applicable primary financial protection. This sec(mdary level
I _ ef financial pr°tecti°n has reached $425 milli°n (85 p°wer Plants _Joperate unde_ t_hi,system). [6,12] '-
t 22 "
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_ 2.2 _ L,I_ll,I'l_ _ _
I .., , , __
. [ 1510001
_ 1967 46 66%
1968 241 67% i
1969 477 67%
1970 784 67% . _'
i 1971 1,017 68%
1972 1,167 67% i
1973 1,393 68%
1974 1,434 68%
I 1975 1,468 : 70%
1976 1,681 70%
I 1977 I,951 70%• i 8 2 1 6 1
1979 2,054 61%
1980 849 20%
1981 I,653 29%I
1982 2,301 35_
1983 3,250 39%
C_ ,,
SODIq_: _ _ FACTS AND FIGURES 1984, AMERICAN
_ INSIIRERS_ ,
•OCRRESR_DS TO PREMI[R INOOME FOR YEAR _N YEARS PRIOR TO
REFUND _%TE.
As part of the secondary l_-el Qf financial protection
program, ANI and MAELU are making available $30 million of ";:
contingent liability that will cover the possibility of default
an retrospective premi_ by alq of the reactor operator% [16]
; These retrospective premiums are onl 2 I_Yable when the liability
costs exceed funds available from primary insurance cc_,_rage. [1]
! The seoandary level of protection is a form of interpersonal loss!
A
spreading.
I Two forms of nucleaz energy liability policy (N_2)
|_ coverage are available from the liability pool. The facility
L
form covers licensees of nuclear production utilization
or
A
[_ ",
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II;_ facilities for liability for injury to the _blic or damage to
J the public's property caused by the nuclear enerqy hazard. _e
nuclear energy hazard is defined as "the radioactive t_ic
. explosive or other hazardous propp_ties of nuclear
=mterial.'[3,11,20] Insurance is applicable only to nuclear
.l
material at the nuclear facility described in the declarations,
" ] accident/y discharged from the facility, or while being
transported to or fr_n the facility and away frum another
facility.[3] The facility form includes'three coverages. Urger
I coverage A the insurer promise_ to defend insured and l_y legal
obligations of insured for damages. C_veracjeB, is first party
insurance which allows the insured to collect from the insurer
for _amages to its property that are not at the nuclear facility,
. but that may be damaged by a nuclear incident at the facility. A
supplier to facility which _ustained damages to its property from
a nuclear incident at the facility _ould a/so collect under
Coverage B. Ooverage C is known as "Subrogation--<)ffsite
Empl_ees," and responds to claims of a contractor's worker
. _tlon insurer.[3,21] '
The _d form of coverage is the suppliers and transporters
policy. Although s,-_zliersand transporters to a nuclea_ facility
1 are insured under that utility's facility fo_m for damages
arising from their activities on behalf of the utility this
second form provides them with additional coverage. It also
l covers suppliers and transporters who are m_ject to nuclear
exposure but who are not performing a service for a named insured
[ _ under a facility form.[3,22]
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_e ocean marine liability risk is :2mracterized by
potentially large liabilities. _be 1978 wreck of the _moco Cadiz
caused a massive oil .pill off the oamst of Brittany which h_s
generated over $2 billion in damage suits. _ had $50 miLl.on
. pollution liability coverage at the time of the accident. -
Legal liability policies in the marine industry are written
to protect ship repairers, stevedores, termim_ operators, and
marina operators.[1,2] These policies offer protection to ar.
Lnsured with the property of others in his care when there is
waterfront exposure or a watercraft risk. Practices associated
with shipowners' liability, however, is more analogous to space
liability, and will be examined in more detail in the following
paragraphs.
A shipuwner's liability due to negligent navigation includes L
any incident involving _Lisvessel in contact with all floatir@ or
fixed objects. _here may be liability without c(mtact, as when
c1,_anageis caused by wash due to a vessel's excessi_ speed.
n _t
When the negligence of two or more vessels are found to have :"
caused damages then liability is proportionately allocated among :,
the two a_ording to _ative degree of their fault (before
1975 liability was equally allocated b_t in a Supreme Court
decision in 1975 the principle o_ proportionate liability was
adopted).[3] Shipowners are covered for legal liability under
protecti,m and indenmity insurance and under a third party
liability provision covering collisions that may be incl_ in
_ tbebull poli.o/. ___ ,
i 25
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In the following t aragraphs pr_ion and irdmmity (Pal)
policies are cc_idered.
i_: least 90% of all shipmmers' liability is insured through
I Psl clubs. _here 20 International
are aRpr_imately clubs,
_rl_ide. In the U.S., the _merican Club is the only mutual
non-[xofit P&I club. Nm_-_mericans began joining the _merican
I Out _l 19_0._4] _he _merican Club includes 35 shipu__.r
members[5] (as of 9/82) and is the ,J_ly active O.S, liability
market for oceangoing fleets.
7
_he clubs, which are non-profit are similarly organized.
Each club appoints a board of directors from its shipowner
membership, which hires managers to run dally operations.[6] P&I
members, w,homust be shipowners, pay an annual premium based on
[. ship size, crew, claims experience and _t fees. When each
member renews, the club underwriterg try to adjust the pr_nium
rating for that member so it reflects the risks to the club of
" claims for that member, taking into account the member's premium
and clah,s record and other factors. In a m,tual associatiun,
the premiums are paid in the form of advam:ed calls during the
currency of the policy year. These form a basic fund out of
which the cla5_ and other out.goings are met. [7] If there are
losses during the year, the club issues extra calls, while if
there is a surplus the club may pay refunds to the members. [6,8]
An appropriate premium rate is usually expressed in terms of "per
l gross tons."
The Federal Limitation of Liability Act (1851), designed to
I _ protect vessel owners from catastrophic losses, r_t caused with _ .,
26 _'
i 986003762-03 i
I
J
1 _r's privity or knowledge, limited the liability of owners for
to l_qpertv arising out of a oolltsion[2,3] to the value
- of the vessel if the owner didn't cause and wasn't previously
t
_ [ aware of cites t,_at caused the loes. Court
interpretations changed over the years. The purpose of the Act
T
I was to encourage growth of the maritime inck_try. Early
litigation set the value of the vessel at its valce at the end of
, the vuyage (obviously in major losses this value was low) plus )
- the freight actually earned ca the vuyage. The judicial climate
began to change in the late 1930's when the owner was often
judged to b= with privity and  led, _ th_ subject to
_ limitation. The qirovich knendment set a maximum limit of $60
per gross ton of vessel when loss of life or personal injury on
L _
" seagoing vessels _ _m,_,iv_.[2]
O%anges in state or federal laws or the enactment of new
laws may change the vessel owner's respmmibilities and
potential liabilities under P&I coverage. (_anges may also
result from judicial interpretati(_s.[2]
TWo types of P&I limits are often referred to: primary and _"::
excess. Usually primary P&I limits are equal to the vessel's
hull value, and excess limits are limits that exceed that
  ount.[2]
-1 It is difficult to find one underwriter who will take the
I entire risk of P&I limits which are often in millions of dollars.
Coverages are thus often written under a number of policies
& %
I arr_x/ed in layers, so t_e underwriters can spread their risk.
Since risk is higher at the lower layers of coverage, higher
premiums are charged for the lower layers of protection than for ,_
j,k 27
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I the u_per la_ers where risk is lower. Underwriters would only be
I involved if the loemes were within their layer of coverage.[2]
For instance, protection provided thEough a British club may be
layered as follows. _he shipmmer's club om_ers the first
$750,000 of _m_ges. Between that and $6 million the club6 share
the reinsuranoe based on the size of each club and its IEe_iu_
i inoome. Loeses above$6millionare reinsuredin Lloyd's and
other market_up to $375million,damages_ycnd whichthepool
%_xtldshare, or the club might cover. [6] British P&I clubs oftent
prcwide unlimited protection, but the _merican club offers up to
i $375 million of protection.
_m _merican Club and _adei.:iters generally provide
coverage unc]ertwo standard protection and indemnity policies
(British P&I clubs each have their own rules.)[9] The standard
policy includes a general clause under which the club agrees to
"indemnify the assured against any loss, damage or expense which
the assured shall be(treeliable to _ay and shall pay by reason of
the fact that the egsured is the owner (o; operator, manager,
ck_rterer, mortgagee, trustee, receiver or agent, as the case may
be) of the insured vessel and which shall result fru_ the"
)
' liabilities, risks, events, occurrenoes and expenditures as set
out in thepolicy.[3,10](1_erageis indemnityand not direct
liability: the insured must have been legally liah *_ pay and
have paid the loss, damage or expense before P&I underwr_ter is
-_ liable under the policy.[3] There are innumerable clauses
avadlable to add, modify or delete coverages. Standard policy 38
[ _ covers the legal liability of theassured for loss of life, _j ,
] 986003762-033
'I
' I injury and death, crew medical andother e_o_ses, _ or
expense in cormection with any fixed or movable Object or
-,,_ property,rem_alof wreckof insuredvesselswhenr._e_ulsory by
i law, fines and penalties except resulting from lack of due
diligence, and legal fees and defense costs resulting from a
,i
liability or alleged liability of assured covered by the policy.
Coverage excludes direct damage to vessels named in policy, loss *
. of use, monetary loss, demurrage, claims regarding vessels in
-- tow, cargoca board_ vessels,claimsunderLongshorem_'s,
• Harbor Workers' _tion Act or any Workers Compensation Act,
i_ contractual liabilities, _r risks and claim, loss, damage or
expense collectable under a Hull Policy.[9,11]
_ _, _ second policy, Standard Policy 23 covers, in addition to
the above coverages, cargo legal liability on the insured vessel
- including passenger, baggage and personal effects, exoess (that
:: is not covered by the hull policy) collision liability for loss
., or damage to another vessel, liability for damage, to another
: vessel not caused by collision, third party liability to fixed
and floating objects,(except another vessel or craft) and %-o
! liability foc oil and hazardous substance spills.[2,3]
}
The provision that covers fixed and floating objects
protects for third _ xty liability damages to piers, docks,
i bridges, jetties, harbor, breakwater, st_Jcture, beacon, buoy,
- lighthouse, cable and cther fixed objects or movable objects
L
(except another vessel or craft or property on board another
_" vessel or craft) whether owned by the assured or not.[i0] When a
vessel comes into contact with stationary or moving objects,
[ _ other than another vessel, the veesel is almost always liable for _ ,
1986003762-034
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I damages. J_t the fact that the vessel was moving is often
I regarded as prima facie evidence that the vessel was at fault.
_be best defense for the vessel owner would be to p_ove that
1 control of the vessel was Jmpo_sible althou_ everyone on board
ea_c_ their best efforts. /_cher defense would be te prove
that improper marking or lighting led to the accident.[2]
The pollution portion of the P&I pol_cy covers liability
for spills of oil and other hazardous substances, whether
arising from a col._isionor not[3] al_ pollution coverage
may be excluded by endorsement and may be offered for an
additional premium.[2]
I There is a collision coverage under this policy for excess
collision liability with vessels not covered by the Hull policy
which covers liability to other vessels if insured's vessel
I caused a collision. The risks that would fall in this category .
&
of P&I coverage are expenses for which the assured is liable for
removing, raising or destroying _ wreck of another ship or
vessel or its cargo, damage done by another ship or vessel to a
harbor, wharf, pier, stage or similar structure as a result of "._
= the insured vessel being in collision with that vessel. Payments :
for dmages to the cargo of the insured vessel by the non-
carrying vessel involved in the collision and included by that
vessel in her counterclaim against the insured or carrying vessel
I in accordax_e with _merican law are also included under this
I clause in the _.olicy.[3]
AS mentioned above, these last two coverages (liability for
[ damage to fixed or movable objects and excess collision
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I liability) seem analogous Partymo6t to third liability
arrangements for Sl_ce vehicle users. Also the third larty
liability pr_ision under the hull policy menti(med below that
oovers collisions is similar to the third party liability for
spacevehiclesusers.
I A lay-up return provision clause is included, which does not
appear on SP-38.[9,12] When a vessel is laid up (knownas a port - '! ,
risk) shipowrers I_Y significantly less than they Pay to l_otect I
a navigating ship. If a ship that has been insured as an active
ship is "laid-up" in Port for longer than 30 days the owner may
receive a return of part of the premium paid.[5]
According to the _merican Club the largest claim to date has
been for $45 million, though maximum insurance coverage i_rovided
i_ through the _merican club has now reached $375 million. [13] The
club's standard limit is $i00 million per incident.
Hull insurance policies include a third party liability
. provision that will cover oollisions: if a vessel negligently
• strikes another vessel causing damage to that other vessel and
1
her cargo, the hull insurance under its Running Down clause, of ","
e
the offending vessel should cover collision damages to the vessel
" i
it struck. If the collision forces the vessel that is struck&
into collision witcha third vessel, the vessel that caused the
I collision is also covered under its hull Policy.[i,14] If the
i vessel that is collided witchstrikes a pier and damages it and
injures persons, then damages are covered under the P & I Policy
i of the vessel that caused the collis_on.[14]
Before 1970, pollution liability was a m/nor concern and the
_ major concern was when oil damaged sumeone's property. Liability
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for cleaning up an oll spill was first _ with
, ] International Civil Liability Convention (CLC) of 1969 (which was
ratified by most maritime nations, although not by the O.S.) and
I the Water Ouality Improvement Act of 1970, in the U.S_ [3,9]
I In 1969, a voluntary program was entered in to by
e
international oil c_es and tanker owners. _e association,
I Tanker Owners VolLmtary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil
PoLlution (TOVAI_P) deals with clean-up oost and not third party
"" ]
liability claims. Tenker owners agree to reimburse governments
for their clean-up costs unless the vessel concerned can pr_e
- that no negl_gence _as involved. Members are encouraged to
instigate cle_n-up operations themselves, regardless of fault,and
if they do the reasonable costs of such voluntary clean-ups are
covered by TOVALOP. Limits covered under _3VALOP are $i00 per
gross ton (of the offending vessel)with a maximum of $16.8
million. Toe agreement is administered by the International
•anker Owners Pollution Federation and the liabilities and
obligations under TDVALOP are insured by the International Tanker
Indmm_ty Association (ITIA) in conjunction with the
international Protection and Indemnity Clubs. [3]
Later another arrangement was introduced by the oil in@astry
_9
] when it became appare_Atthat the amount available for clean-up
under TOVALOP would probably not be sufficient. The Contract
• Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil
Pollution (t_bTAL) has the (_jective of providing additional
_tion to gove_t or ot_r third parties suffering
'I qjpollution damage which they cannot fully recover from the owner %
32 ':
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liability. _ also seeks to er_ouracje voluntary cle,lm-up
L
[
-_ I of the owners own clem_-t._ _ts after other available remedies
: have been exhausted. Membership is limited to oll c_nies
,_ ] enga_a in theproa_tlal,refining,or marketingof oll.
'_ _ operates if the vessel carrying the oll cargo is a m_ber of
• _ArALoP and the cargo carried is owned _ a (3RLg'/_Lmember.
" It b_s been suggested "chatthe vol_tary associations uere a "
:_ public relations exercise and _re intended to obviate the
I for pollution legislation. Sowever, maritime nations have
' : introduced severe pollution laws.[3]
' In the U.S. Federal legislation and implementing regulations
" have imposed and defined liabilities of vessel owners and
'_ operators in spills of oil and hazardous substanoes.[9]
I Legislation has set limits of liability when damages were not 4_e
to wilful misconduct or negligence within the privity and
knowledge of the vessel owner O: -erator, and established
| to provide for claims. In addition to Federal legislation .
individual states have enacted regulations concerning oil
. pollution claims. Thus, a vessel owner may be liable to the
Federal _vernment for clean-up oosts and to state and thir_
! party claimants also.[3]
I The Water Oua/ity Improvement Act of 1970 introduced the
princii_l of strict liabilit3 whether or not there was
l negligence. Except whe,,a spill from a vessel was the result of
[ an act of God, an act of war, negligenoe by the United States, oran act or omission by a third party, the owner of the vessel is
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!I liable for clean-up coets incurred by the O.S. 9overrme_
I (private claims are not effect_ _ this legialatica).
Originally the _et limited liability to $i00 per gross ton up to
a maximum of $14 million. _e Clean Water ;_t of 1977 and 1978
the ]halts of liability. For inland oil barges the limit!
was the 9reater of $125 per gross ton or $125,000; for tankers
the limit was the greater _ $150 pe_ gross ton or $250,000 and
for other vessels it was $150 per gross ton with no floor. _e
7
_ previous $14 minion oeiling _ liability _ms r_ed. If the
spill was caused by wilful _ within the vessel owner's
prlvity and knowledge, the owner is liable for the full cost of
u clean-up without limitation.[3,9]
t
The Omuprehenslve Environmental Response, Om_pensation and
[
i Liability _ct of 1980 [15], which has not yet been impl_aented
i set limits for liability for costs incurred by the U.S.
" gove_ in removal or rmDedial action caused by incidents
involving release of a hazardous substance.
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization _ct (TAPA) pr_ides
-I
. a $14 million limit of liability to vessel£ loading oil from the '
Trams-Alaska pipeline. The Act covers all 4_ages including
clean-up costs, sustained publicly or privately. Strict liability
shall not be /_posedif damages _re caused by acts of a_r and
, negligence of the government or the damaged f_rty.[3,16]
Actually, the _ states that strict liability for claims arising
i out of one incident shall not exceed $i00 million. '_e owner and
operator of the vessel is liable for the first $14 million of
i _ claims (financial r_ibility f°r $14 million had t° be _ "
| 34
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l dmor_trated before the oil was loaded} _e remair_r of the
I
da_ges up to $100million is to be paid t_ the fund (the Tra_s-
Alaska Pipeline Liabillty Fund)provided for in the R_t _e
_- fund could be used to pay for clesn-up, resources, injuries, andi
third party claims. A 5 cent per barrel tax on oil pe_sLlg
]', through the V_,tez temt.r_ provides funding.[17]
The Deep Water Port Act of 1974 limits liability for dame.s
i and cleanup costs resulthg from discharge of oil caused by
i vessels at deel_raterports. Liability is limited to $150 per
E
gross ton or $20,000,000, whichever is lesser, _eept if the
I discharge wa_ to or gross negligence withindue wilful
the prlvlty of the owner and operator, in w_ich case they are
liable for full oosts of cleanup and damages. The Act sets up a
Deepwater Port Liability Furi _f $i00 million which shall be used
if liability exceeds $20 million. Tb_ fund is raised by a 2 cent
per barrel tax on oil handled by an deep water terminal.[17,18]
The Outer (bntinental Shelf Lands Act ?__r_ments of 1978
established an Offshore Oil Pollution (bmpensation Fund {not to
exceed $200 million) -aised by imposing a per barrel fee on oil ";
%
obtained from the Outer Cont_ Shelf. Liability limits are
set for oil polluti-n damages caused by vessels operating in the
waters above the Outer Continental Shelf or in the waters above
submerged lands _seaward from the coastline of a state &.-a
transporting oil _irectly from an offshore facility. Liability
o.
for damages caused by such vessel is limited to $250,000 or $300
i" per gross ton, whichever is greater, if the incident was notw_
caused by wilful misconduct or gross ql_genoe within the
[ _ privity or knowledge of the o_ner.[19]
I "
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2.3 _ J__
._ , Aviation insurance was orig/raI2y underwritten by insurers "
.,_ in marine and aocident departnmnts which still handle some
u insur_e associated with air transport, such as aiE cargo
_- (normally insured under marine _x)licles)or personal accident
policies protecting air travellers (handled by accident -
_ departments). _r, in recent decades, a distinctive aviatl(m
-- market has developed to handle demand frgm the rapidly growing
_ry. Insurance c_mpanie_ that write sub6_umtial aviation
} business have set up specialist aviation departments or
_:ialist aviation insurance companies.[i]
. i _ three primary aviation markets, U.S. _wiati(m Insuranoe
._ Grot_ (USAIG)and Associated Aviation Underwriters (AN3) and the
Imnd(m market [2] work under a quota share environment whereby
each underwriter takes a percentage of the limit and nereemtage
._ of their share of the premiu_ for certain lines of major airline
business.[3]
Aircraft are classified for insuram=e pu_ into air "_:
carriers (the airlines), _ general aviation which includes
I private aircraft (personal enjoyment.,and business uses),
e
corporate flying [=ircraftowned and operated by corporations for
transporting executives) et_ commercial flying (rental and
I charter work, student instruction and operation of aircraft for
hire other than air carriers).[4] Liability policies are also
I written for other air transport related risks such as hangar
keepers liability, airport owners' liability ar_ fue!ers'
I _ li_*li_/.._ac_urers' produc_ liability risks cor_titute q; "
36 _.;, _j.
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i another class of Ir_urar_e.
I _here are t/_reebasic liability coverages that are included
in aviation package policies: passenger kxxiily injury, bodily
= I injury excluding passengers and property damage. LICk'S
_ ai,'craft liability policy for instance, defines six coverages.|
Through Coverage A the insurer agrees to pay legal (_ligations of
" I the insured for damages for bodily injury caused _ occurrence I
and arising out of tha ownership, mintenanoe or use of the
I aircraft. O_verage B covers legal obllga'tionsof the insured due
_ to property damage, Coverage C covers passenger bodily injury|
liability, Coverage D is single limit bodily injury including
] passengers and property damage liability, Co_-erageE is single
: limit bodily injury excluding passengers and property damage
? T
] liability and Coverage F pays reasonable medical expenses, and
] funeral services for persot-_swho sustain bodily injury sickness
or disease by accident while in, entering or alighting from the
] aircraft.[5] Coverages A, B, and E appear to be analogous to
third party liability coverage for space vehicle users.
: In recent years, the trend has been towards the
•._ _. simplification of insurance programs. Up through the late 1960's '
an airline probably would have a separate hull, bull war,
l passenger liability, third-fatty liability, freight liability,
mail legal liability and cargo liability policies. New it is
l common for an insurer to issue (_-_ytwo policies;a combined hull
I and liability insurance covering _/_one limit of indemnity all
types of liability risk and a separate hull war policy.[I]
.. i _ The level of insurance required for some aviation risks _ ,.
| '%
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I (such as liability) my strain the capacit7 of intena_imai
insurmM_ .arkets. • , substantial potential liabilities require
I direct underwriters rind reinsurers to spread the risk as widely
as po_ible. Leading mKlerwrlters usually a¢oept between 5 and
t
10% of major risks. National aviation pools and sharL_g
I agreements (reinsurance arran_ments) have b_en used to spread
risks and more effectively mobilize capacity.[1]
! ,The Federal gove_ sets minimum limits on liability
i coverage. Section 298.42 of the Civil AercmauticsBoard (CAB)
Ecunumic Regulations Part 298 requires air taxi operators,
engaging in air to maintain aircraft accide_transportation
liability insurance and specifies a required minimum lim/t of
I liability coverage. _here is a limit for any one passenger of at
r least $75,000 and a limit for each occurrence ir any one aircraft
of at least $75,000 multiplied by 75% of the total number of
passenge_ seats installed in the aircraft. _ m{nin_ limit on
. liability for bodily injury to or death of persons excluding •
. r_u_ers is $75,000 for any one person in any one occurrence
" and a limit of at least $300,000 for each oocurrerK_. A mbdmum
limit on liability for loss of or damage to property is set at
$i00,000 for each oocurrence. [6]
U.S. air carriers are subject to part 205 of the (_B
ec(m(m_c regulations. A U.S. or foreign direct air carrier must
I meet the requirements of part 205 to receive the Light to engage
in air transportation. _e carrier is required to make available
I proof of insurance or self-insuram=e to the CAB. Tn. d party
aircraft accident liability coverage,for bodily injury to or
I _ death of persons including n(memployee cargo attendants, _/ ,
I 38 "
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excl_li_ passengers and for dama_ to property aust meet the
• _ minlmm ltmtt of $300,000 for any one person in any one
occurrence, and a total of $20,000.000 per tx_olved aircraft for
each oocurre_e. It. the case of acct_s _volvL_ aircraft of
. _ fewer than 60 seat or 18,000 Pom,_ maximum payload capacity the i'
. ' minlmu_ coverage is :_2,000,000 per involved aircraft per -i'
occurrence. 9he limits of liability apply separately for each ![{
e
occurrence. A minimum,of coverage for bodily injury to,or death
; of aircraft passengers is $300,000 per passenger and a total Per
t
-, involved aircraft for each occurrence of $300,000 times 75% of
' the number of passenger E_ats installed in the aircraft.[7]
It is difficul to generalize about aviaticn insurance
because in the U.S. aviation policies are not standardized.
&
Premfiumsvary significant/y, there are no published rate manuals,
. usually no filed rates, and most rates are taken from general
guides or "off the top of. the head'. [8] Rates are based on
:" criteria such as pi1._tqualificationE, make and model of the
3
aircraft, how _/_eaircraft will be used, bow the aircraft is -_,
stored, fre_ncy and mileage of flights, type of coverage
required, airfields that are frequented, and aircraft
capacity. [5,9,10] There is no precise actuarial or scientific
basis for the rate because of the relatively small _r of
units involved. Rates are based on past statistics and
I underwriters' risk assessments or judgment. ,_' Liabilityt _.u,I
premiums are often based on the number of revenue passenger miles
flowr..[5,9] In the _se of passenger liability, the logic of
"r_t_ Charging per r_ven_ _r mile i_ _bviOu_ly tO S_ure _n _ '%'
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;_ I increas_ premium in proportion to _ greater e_x_sure. [1]
S_y and 4_mand influence rates. Activities and practices
I of the aviation pool m_bers over the years seems to indicate
i
: I that participation varies wlth the immediate past underwriting
experience generated by all lines of insurance as opposed to
I umderwriters surplus. Ur_erwrlters have been bold when loss
: ratios were low and have restricted commitments when loss -
I ratios were high. Rates are susceptible to previous losses: when
I underwriters are faced with losses in excess of premiums they
subsequently raise premiums to break even. For ezample, record
i losses suffered by aviation insurers in 1983 will ammmt to $700
. million in hull and liability payments. The 1983 premium volume
amotmted to between $500 million to $550 million. According to
: 1 one broker, r_te hikes in the _ market are averaging 37.5% !
for hull coverage and 23.5% for liability coverage. British ;
I5 Airways premium rate for liability insurance alm_t doubled from :
$3.53 million to $6.95 million, this year. [13] Pan Am paid _
significantly higher rates on hull and liability coverage and in
i addition has agreed to a $i0 million aggregate deductible for
hull and liability losses in addition to per occurence ,,
I deductibles for partial hull losses.J14] A London underwriter
expects that airlines with high loss records will be confronted
with average (werall renewal rate hikes of 40%.[11]
Skandia Insurance Campany, Ltd. of Stockholm maintains a data
bank of aviation statistics. Their data on airlines with a fleet
" I value of larger than $20 million, indicates that liability rates
in the U.S. market between June 1976 and May 1979 were
: substantially lower than the breakeven rates.[12]
f_ I 40 S>
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2.40:_m:lercial _
Onder traditional PrL(tedStates tort law, if the _uttle
and/or payloads contained within it were to cause damage to a
thin] party, the U.S. government and users of the _huttle would
be potentially liable to the thin] parties, based on negligence
or absolute liability (liability without proof of fault or
, regli_.nce). [
_he United Nations' Convention on International Liability
fOE Dmnage Caused by Space Objects, which the United States is a
i party to,[i] holds a launching State absolutely liable to pay
: _tion for damage caused by its space object on the surface
of the earth or to aircraft in flight.[2] The launching State is
• c_rc_d with liability for all space objects launched from within
its borders, regardless of satellite ownership, so a claimant "
i only needs to file claim against the launching State regardless
of the ownership of the object that caused the damage. [3] If
- damage is caused other than on the earth's surface to a space
object, or persons on board that space object, of one laun_
"I
i
: State, by a space object of another laun_ State, _be latter
' will be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the
fault of persons for whom it is responsible.[2] _he Cor_ention
does not apply to damages caused by a space object of a laur_
State to the nationals of that State, or foreign nationals who
are participating in the operation of that space object from the
! time of its launching until its descent, or when they are in the
immediate vicinity of a planned launch or recovery area. J3]r
L _ (Additional Articles in the Conventio_ indicate liability when a
:[ •41
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" third State is involved, or when two or more States jointly
_ la_ a space _jeet.)[2]
It has been _'s policy slrK_ the late 1_0's[4] to
V
require commercial users of launch vehicles to _ third party
-- liability insurance that will l_eCec_ the U.S. from potential
" tort liability resulting from injury to third parties and non-
i U.S. government users of expendable vehicles have been able to
obtain at least $500 million worth of third party liability
! insurance per launch.[],4] :
!_ _he Shuttle Launch Agreement requires the customer to
obtain, at no cost to NASA, insurance protecting the CUstumer and
I the U.S. Guvernment from any third party liability for damage
arising out of the performance of the agreement during the Risk
i Period defined in the agreement. _he Risk Period begins at the
; start of the physical attachment of the Payload to the Orbiter
and ends after the launch of a payload '_on the landing of the
particular Orbiter without cau_ g damage to third parties, or if _
a payload is jettisoned, when the payload impacts the earth
win causing damage to third parties, whichever occurs last.
If third parties are damaged, the risk period ends immediately
W
after all such damage occurs. Or the risk period ends prior to
• _ the launch of a psyload upon completion of re,oval of the Rmyload
from the orbiter for any reasons.[5]
I Under an amendment to the National Air and Space Act of
I 1958, NASA has been authorized to pc_ide liability ir_uranee and
to indemnify a user of a space vehicle for c]-ims for damages
[
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I the risk period deflned above. _ mom-_ment is section 308 of
the NASA Act and is descril_d in the following l_r_rapk_s.
_. The customer is also required to Obtain, at no cost to NASA
j- insurance protecting the customer and the [J.S. Gove_ from
any third party liability for damage caused by a deployable
payload element following deployment (not including a payload
that remains tethered to the Orbiter).[5] NASA will rot IxoviOe
J
J liability insurance or indemnify for damages arising4_ring the
J period foll_ing deployment and after the Orbiter has landed.
This coverage is requi_d to be in force indefinitely [18] and is
[i usually renewed every three years.[6]
The launch agre_.ent also includes an interparty waiver ofI liability under which each party agrees not to bring a claim
i against or sue the ¢*.herparty or other customer and agrees to
absorb the financial and other conseguenoes of damages it
i sustains as a result of participation in STS operations whether
or not such damage is caused by NASA, the customer, or other
L
1 custmm_rs participating in STS operations, and regardless of
i whether such damage occurs through negligence or otherwise.
l
%
This Interparty waiver applies indefinitely to any party to a
j" shuttle launch agreement, whether or not they are are the same
shuttle flight. Each party therefore agrees to abeorb the
-1
consequences (financial and other) of damage to Its property.[51
J If a payload specialist sustains bodily injury, the
individual or his estate may sue one of the Parties to the launch
agreement but the individual's employer may not sue any of the
parties to the launch agreement because o_ the interparty
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l _s ir_er-7_ty waiver is extended to other participants in
I S_ operations, including c_tractors and subc_tractors and
other custumers who are therefore protected from claims
I. i :luai gF oa ctliabilityclam whichotherwisemight
=- l_rsued by the Imrtins or their contractors or subc_tractors, or
" other amtumrs). [5]
i For the first few launches, before the interparty waiver " i
came into effect (prior to December 1982), a Shuttle contractor
. such as Rockwell carried liability insurance for each launch
to protect against claims by Shuttle users for damage to the
user's property (third party risks were also c_ered, but
._ , potential third party damages were considered r_aote). Premiums
for each launch were $1.4- $1.5 million. To the extent that -
NASA's funds were used to reimburse contractors and
subcam_tractors,payment of such high premiums were considered to
r
be to the detriment of NASA's space missions. NASA then agreed
to indemify NASA contractors under Public Law 85-804 for claims
or losses resulting from use or perfo: ance of products or
services defined in the agreement (includingspace transportation ":"
system, _ts, cargo flight elements or ground support,
: repair, modification, and overhaul support to the STS).[4,7]
_he custumer also agrees in the launch agreement, not to
I
make a claim against the U.S. Government and the U.S.
Goverrment's contractors and subcontractors, for damage or
i relief for any delay in provision of any aunch and associated
services or for non-performance or improper performance of launch
- 4
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_e _mmmdment to the National _eronautics and Space Act of
1958, referred to above, adds a new Section 308 (which is part of
Public Law 96-48 see.6) to the _ (and renumbers tt_ previous
308 to 309),[11,13] which authorizes NASA to Provide liability
insurance and to in_ a user of a NASA space vehicle for
claims of third parties that may result frum activities carried
out in oonnectionwith launch, o_erations or recovery of the
space vehicle. [8]
f_J_ction (a) of Section 308 authorizes the h_ministratiun
on such terms, and to the extent it may deem appropriate, to
provide liability insurance for any user of a space vehicle to
cum[mmsate all or a portion of claims by third parties for death,|-
[ inj.., of toprobity
|- activities carried oil in oonnection with the launch, operations
or recovery of _ space vehicle. Appropriations available to
I" the ;_m/[_st[at_on may be used to procure such insurance, but.
users must reimburse NASA to maximum extent practicable by users
, uT_]er reimbursement policies established pursuant to section 203
- (c). [9,10]
Subsection (b) of Section 308 authorizes NASA at its '
discretion to enter into agreements with a user of a space
vehicle which would provide for the indemnification of that user
F
| against claims by third parties for damage resulting from
activities carried out in c _mection with the launch, operations
or recovery of the space vehicle, to the extent that such claims
I are not ccmpmmated by liability insurance of the The
user.
_ministrator must issue implementing regulations which take into
I _ account the availability, oost andterms of liability insurance
I 45 "_
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I before entering into any such _jre_nts. The indemnification
i may, at _'s discretion, be limited to claims other than claims
resulting from users' actual negligence, wilful misconduct, or
both. Payments may be made frum funds available for research and
development not other wise committed, or frum funds appropriated
_ for such payments.[9,10,Ii]
=- A "user" is defined as anyo,e who enters into agreement with
NASA to use all or part of a space vehicle, who owns or pr_'-des
_', property to be flown on the vehicle, or who employs a pez_on to
be flown on the vehicle.
;
_ _ A "space vehicle" is defined as an object intended for
latmch, launched or assembled in outer space, including Shuttle
and other camponents of the Space Transportation System, and
°
: includes elements of STS such as Spacelab and upper stages in
addition to the payload to be flown on t_e S_uttle for a user.
Third party is defined as any person who may bring a claim
against a user for death, bodily injury or loss of or damage to
property (a claim for any damage sounding in tort). Third party
usually _es not include users contracting with NASA for launch
services, as per the inter-party waiver mentioned above.[9]
Section 6 of Public Law 96-48 is implemented in 14 CFR Part
12/4. According to 12/4.13(c) of this rule NASA requires each
user to obtain insurance in an amount not in excess of $500
million dollars, but recognizing that there does not seem to be
the insuranoe capacity to insure a single shuttle flight for more
_ than one billion dollars, the Age will accept that there may
'i [ _ be Shuttle flights with payl°a_s_°f several u_ers that are _I _
] 986003762-05 ]
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,_ ] imu:ed under _ policy fo:no"in excess of me billion
_ollars. _his is acce!_able during the fli_t, however,mob
T
._ . user is expected to insure their deployed payload for $500
i million &_llars. The rule states that _ will i_smtfy users
flying small se_f-contained payloads and users providing payload
_ecialist servloesforNASamissionsundera NASAcontractfor
a
'_ third Party liabilityto theextentthatsuchclaims are _,ot .
.i _ted by the liability insurance of the particular user.
T
Theseuserswill notbe requiredto obtaininsurance.
In additionNASAhas inc%mmificationagre_ts with those
, it hasJointEndeavorAgreemants(JEA)with. OndertheJEA,
' provides free launch service while the _ provides
! experiments to or other payloads to NASA. NASA does not require
insurance for the Shuttle flight and _ies during research
" flights. Foreign users are not required to plrchas_ third party+
t liability insurance, but NASA does not agree to
All other users of a NASA space vehicle must d_min
insurance protecting themselves, the U.S. Government and other .,
I
persons or entities identified in the launch and associated
: services agreement entered into by NASA and the users for th/rd
party liabilities. The amotmt of insurance and the terms and
- conditions of the insurance shall be agreed to by NASA and the
I user depending on the insurance available in the world market at
a reasonable premium. The Associate Administrator for Space
I Flight, with agremnent of the General Opunsel and Comptroller,
may waive thls requirement for a particular user and/or flight if
J
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I Intezest. _ge_cles of the U.S. Government (definedin 5 U.S.C.)
I 102 and 105 will not be required to ubtain _ insuran_.
NASA may i_ each user (with the excepti_ of _=her
i U.S. Government agencies) for liability incurred by the user in
excess of the NASA approved insuranoe policy Of the user subject
J to terms, (xmditions and exceptions oontai-_d in the
/
, indmmu[fication agremnent. A user will not be _ied for
payments that fall within the deductible of the user's policy, or
aren't covered c%ueto exclusions in the policy except for the
; [ maximum dolla_ limitation stated in the policy or standard
.& exclusion agreed to by NASA for shuttle-cau:ed pollution or
interference with _adi6 fzeql_ncies, or for paymzmts to
% t
.'_ contractors or subcontractors for liability incurred by them, or
j
settlement payments unless agreed to by the U.S. government. If
" NASA determines that adequate thir6 party liability insurance is
not available on reasonable terms and co,ditlons or at a
r_le premium in the commercial insurance market or if NASA
determines that the availability of third party liability
insurance prevents an orderly and equitable allocation of the ';
i risk of liabil_.tyNASA will try to p[cwide adequ-'- liability :
protection for users and the U.S. gove_t choosing cr_ of the
following three options.[8]
The first option would be to have a user(s) chosen by NASA
I be authorized to purchase an insurance policy protecting all
;" l uninsured users ca the flight, the U.S. Government, and other
persons or entities party to the launch and associated services
C
_ I _ agr_t _et'_me_ _b_'_A _d t_e U_er_= _e pr_iu_ _ be _ ,
• 48 ""
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I _ all the users with the exception of a mall self-
allocated
ccntaired peylo_ user, or U.S. G_errment _Fmcy.
I A ee_md option ,,.a.tld allow NASA to d_tain an insurance
I policy and equitably allocate the premium amung the users on that
flight, again except for self-cuntained payload users and
I gove_t agencies.
U_er the third option NASA would lndemdfy uninsured users
for a premium that will be put into an Indmmlflcation pool that
7 NASA would use to In_ users or to offset equitably premiums
of other users. _ option would be chosen by _ (relywhen it
W-
determlnes that adequate insurance is not available at ai
reasonable premium and on reasonable terms and (x_iticms in the
_r. ommmrcial insurance market.[8]
Under these provisions NASA may provide liability insuranoe
-- to users at its discretion on "such terms and to the extent it
may deem appropriate," to _te users for claims by third
parties. Tram, NASA may provide _,murance to some users and
charge those users for the insurance, or it could exen_:_ ot/_er
i users from the requirement of cttaining or paying for third party
q
liability insuranoe at all. Urger this section the
I _ministrator may use appropriated funds available to NASA to
purchase third party liability insurance for a number of shuttle
flights. The Administrator would seek reimbursement to the
oaxim,_ extent practicable from users under general Shuttle
reimbursmmmt policies, by charging users a fixed price for
I insurance based on an estimate of the cost of insurmace, number
i cf Shuttle flights and users to be protected _ the insurance
: policy and other factor_. Other reasonable methods of oollecting
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| from users for insurance m_j, be adopted by _ according to
theirexperie,ceand the insuranoethat is available.[i]
NASA is not expectedto use appropriatedfunds f9 protect
?
_ the U.S. Governmm_ from liability, but Submection(a) is broad
enoughto includeeven that.[9,11,12]
NASA and International_=hnology Underwriters(IN_) have
-: [ a mmoranam of understandingin which it is recngnized that
IN_ECwill establishand administeran "underwritingfacility"to
_ provide thirdparty liabilityinsurance:foruserswho choose to
,_ insurethL_ug_the facility. The facilitywill supportonly the
!
i | U.S. launchprogr_n. I_I_Cwill attemptto increasecapacityofi
=_!_ thirdparty liabilityinsuranceto $750million and "_ Ix_sib!e
,_ $I billion per flight, and (_MuLinthe insuram_ at the lowestb_
;[ .-_
]" possible premium rate and, as administratorwill equitably
_ -. allocatethe premiumamong users on the same flight, in addition
?
" to providingcoverageon an individualbasis.[13]
• 'Fne insuranoepolicy put togetherby INIECcoversa period
m
c(mmencingwith the attachmentof payloadby bolt to the Shuttle
and erf_ing36 months later unless the user's p_ load is ,_
jettisoned,in which case the policyperiodwill en_ for that1 '
userwhen the payloadimpactsthe EaC.h wit.hourcausingdamageto
I thirdparties.
! A limitof liability,if there is one user identifiedin the
F-hedule of User'sand Payloads, is $500,000,000for all damage
, _ arisingout of any one oocurreneeduringthe riskperiod defined| in the la_ch agreesmmt.[14_ So far, INTEChas been able to
, ! _ obtain up to $750 millionof capacityto insure one single
i 50 _° r
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_ I shuttle launch.[6] The limit of liability may _e used to
satisfy the legal liability of one or more of the insureds
identified under the policy for any one occurrence. If the limit
of liability has been reduced or exhaust._d because of ImWments
of liability claims of same of the users insured by the policy
: then other users under the policy may seek alternative
prutectiun including _ication by _ as described in the -
,. launch agreement. Despite the number of useEs insured under the
policy the limit of liability for all damages is $500,000,000 for
:-._." each insured payload for any one occurrence from the time each
t
•_ payload is deployed as defined in the launch agreement.[14]
--_,- Damages that are excluded under the policy include damage
caused by rad_(mctive contamination (except for liabilityfor
: damage caused by a payload when proximate cause of damage is
: radiation naturally occurring in sp_ce envirormmmt;)damage
arising out of conduct of another venture of which insured is
involved and which isn't designated in declarations as an
insured; act of war; radio frequency interferer_e with another
commmicaticns system; discharge, dispersal, releuse or escape of
%
smoke vapours, soot, etc. unless such discharge, etc. is sudden
and acclde_W_/; liability of any insured as manufacturer;
obligation of insured to his employees or obligations for which
, insur,_ (or a_, of his insurers) may be liable to his own
i employees under worker's compermation, un_]oyment, death or
disability benefits law or any similar law; liability for damage
l to property of insured, claims for failure of insured's
spacecraft to provide _cations service(s).[14]
I _ :/he Office of Man_ and Budget has questioned the _ .."
I 51 "_
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to which the government sb_Id provide or c/_2utn
| Insura_m for .m_f_ral users of _ vehicles and has asked
", _ to establish criteria to detemine when Federal immrar_e is
I in the publicinterest. (_S dbjectsto the lack of specificity
cm_ernlng the cen_timm underwhich the Federal 9_errint
should provide insurance to or _ a user of a _ space
-?
l vehicle. In particular (RB mentions the lack of clarity of the
underlined terms in the stat_ent "if NASA determines that
1 _ third _ _ _ is not available on
_._- _ _rms and F._¢_ or at a /__1£ _ in the
i-._ cu_ercial insurance market or if NASA determines that the
"_ i avallabilityof third _r._" liabli_" insurance prevent_ an
-._ _I/X _ _ _ of the riskof liability." Also
there is no indicationin the rule of what informationNASA will
use to determinethe availabilityof insurancein the cumn_rcial
i market. Another objectic,l is that the publicinterest is not
• _ defined in certainsectionsof th_ rule thatwould allow NASA to
o
waive insurancerequirementsfor _me usersof space vehicles.
1 nor does it providecriteriato be used in waivingthe insurance ;;
requiremsuts. (RB has requested that NASA clarify these
ambiguities and identifythe data as well as assumptions NASA
I will use in detemmlni.gthe _ of insuranceavailablein the
worldmarket, how much insuram_ each usermust procureand what
• I could be the potentialliabilityto the U.S. Treasury if the
Federalgovernmentprovidedinsuranceto spacevehicleusers.[14]
"1
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I 2.5 _Ama_ _ and_
Several practicesand precedentsfr_ the industries]" reviewedmay be of relevanceto issuesconcerningthird party
j liability insurance for space vehicle users.
Th-_-reis precedent for gove_t involvement in private
sector liability. _he Federal Limitation of Liability Act of
1851 set a precedent, in that through it the government tried to
eneourage development of the shipping industry by limiting
shipoaners liability.
i
Designed to encourage development of the nuclear power
inci_try, the Price-Anderson Act limited nuclear operators'
liability and committed the gove_t to indemnify nuclear plant
!
operators for liabilities in excess of the commercially available
insurance.
_ In the marine area, a number of A:ts-Deep .ater Port Act,
: Outer Continental Shelf Act, etc.--limit liability of shipowners
for damages caused by spills of oil and other hazardous
substances and establish funds to pay damages in excess of the
limitation.
The concept of layering is based on the'fact that smaller
claims are more likely than larger claims and therefore rates fOE
covering lower layers are higher than rates for covering higher
layers.
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lI _ere are many factors that contr/but_ to the process of
setting insurance rate_, claim statistics, cospetltive market
I forces, corporate strategy, pr_itability and overhead are a few.
Of these, one might expect claim statJ_dcs to be the dominant
• factor. And, inck_, there are cases when it might be--health
_ insurance, life irmuranoe, autmK_ile collision insurance. But
there are insured risks for which claim statistics provide little
' useful information. These include rlskS that have an extremely!
Iv low pr(2_ability of occurrence, but very high c(msequenoe and
thus, high liability limits. Nuclear power plant liability is a
good example. Hopefully, the risk of a catastrophic aocldent,
resulting in high claims, is so low that such an accident will
. never occur. In fact, after some 800 reactor-years of
'_ experience, the worst accident has been the incident at Three
Mile Island, with total liability claims just under $30 million.
This is against an insured liability limit of $160 million.
" There exist no claims in the upper $130 million of coverage.
i In a case such as this, how can rates be set? For (me
thing, mathematical models might be used to est/mate risk. But
the models could be misleading or, in fact, totally wrung and, in
any event, would be difficult or impossible to validate. The
insurer must take a more pragmatic approach. The following
M_
discussion outlL_es, in highly simplified terms, a method by
which rates may be set for insurance againstthese types of
risks.
I 54 _"
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I First, it is to observe that insurers seekhelpful always
to diversify their risks so that laws of averages apply. As
I Figure 3.1 shows, there are thcee dimensions over which an
I insurer can diversify risk: the insured population, tree, and
across risks. The insured population oomprlses the set of
I insurance buyers--the insured--for a particular risk. In the
cases of health insurance, life insurance, and autom_ile
F
| liability insurance, the insured populations each range into the
events are so common that yearly actuarial data reflect well the
"c_t" of providing insurance, and year-to-year trends provide a
,, good indication of systemic changes. For these r_,
I population is the preferred dimension for diversification.
: Sometimes, as is the case with commercial aviation and
marine liability insurance, the population--for instance, the
number of commercial airliners--is too small to affect adequate
diversification by population alone. In cases such as these,
: insurers tend to diversify over time. Diversifying over two
years, in essence, doubles the population; ten years increases it
by an order of magnitude. Insurers prefer to diversify across
time when the population is too small to diversify across
population alone because time-diversification still enab es the
insurers to tre_: each insured risk as a "product line."
Insurers want to do this so that rates can be set for each risk
that will assure profitability for each product line. And, of
course, insurers want to cover a particular risk only if they can
]'
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FIGURE3.1 DI;IENSIONSOF RISK DIVERSIFICATION
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But, if insurers do resort to the t/me dimension to achieve
I adequate diversification, they want diversification to be
accomplished in as short a period as posslble--preferably two or
I three years, and in no case more than ten years. One way _o look
I at time diversification is that the time _ to achieve
diversification is roughly the minimum time necessary to assure
profitability. _us, it is possible to shorten the time period
necessary for time diversification by raising rates. But raising! .
rates is not always the best course of acti_'l.
i As a last resort, insurers diversify across risks.
Diversification by insurers, both companies and Indivi_ml
underwriters, across risks is a common practice, but not at the
a
-:. level of tla industry as a whole. Elaborate practi__s, such as
_ reinsurance, have been established to provide diversification for
. the individuel, but the "_try" maintains its view of the
{ product line as a means of rate setting. THUS, diversification
across risks on an _try-w_de basis can be expected only for
those insured risks with so few activities that wit.h/n-risk
diversification cannot be achieved, even over a number of years.
Third-party liability insurance,for space activities mlght fall
into this category.
A brief digression may shed further light on the process of
insurance rate setting. _am/ people view the purchase of
" insurance as the placing of a bet--a bet by the insured with the
, ,_ insurer that some undesirable event will happen. But insurance
is not a bet. A bet seeks to widen the range of possible futures
.[: _ for the bettor. For example, a personwhocould r-- at his _k._ r
| ",
57 _.
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I status quo, but places a bet on a horse race, has broadened his
range of futures to his status quo minus his bet on the low side
l (if the horse loses) to his status quo plus winnings on the high
_ side (if the horse wins). The cuto0we of his bet is likely to be
_cic_ed at an instant in time, and in the near term. Insurance
does just the it the of possibleo x ite: range
futures, generally ooverlng a range of time, and not necessarily
i in the near term.
I In the undertaking of some activlty--driving an automobile,
launching a spacecraft, living--there are risks of undesirable
[i outcomes. By buying insuranoe, the insur_ reduces his status
quo by the cost of the insurance, but also reduces or eliminatesi
: altogether the impact of an undesirable event. The key is that
the insurer serves as broker to diversify risk: he is in the
b ',
business of buying and selling risks. To be specific, brokers do
i the buying and selling; underwriters hold diversified risks.|
Both these groups want an economic return for their activity.
They use information where it is available, but they must also
I
make decisions--buy and sell decisions--in the absence of -:.
information. Their method for making decisions in the absence of
i
information has evolved over hundreds of years. It is unwritten
and untaught, it is not based on mathematical rigor, but it is
!
pragmatic and, over the long term, it keeps them in business.
_, Suppose the perpetrator of an activity that has never been
conducted in the past wishes to insure some aspect of that
i activity. Potential insurers could simply refuse to provide
coverage for reason of lack of actuarial data. But the activity
[ _ could appear tobe relatively "safe" (from the insured risks), _ .
][ "
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I and failure to provide insuranoe would lose the insurer an
c_ortumity for economic gain. But, to insure the risk, the
insurer mast pick a premium. One strategy for picking a premium
revenues to cover a maximum liability loss after insuring some
number, N, of such activities. For example, if the set-aside
I period is ten activities, then the premium would be one tenth
|
(I_ of the insuranoe policy value.* To this premium can be
_ added profit, overhead, etc. _ question remaining is, simply,
how to pick N. _ answer, provided that sufficient within-risk
I/ diversification is possible, is to pick a value for N such that N
i activities involving the risk wJ/l be insured in a reasonable
period of time--typically 1 to 5 years. For example,if an
i
: average of 20 e(mmercial payloads per year were each insured for
$500 million, the insurer would have to charge $5 million per
!
• payload to set aside enough reserves to cover a maximum liability
loss after 5 years.
Once a risk is insured, experience is gained that can be
used for adjustir_ future rates. If no claim experienoe occurs, ,,.
the insurer oould (xmsider lowering his premium or issuing
- premium refunds as occurs with nuclear liability insurance
: premiums. But he would be likely to do so only if the frequency
of the activity increases so that he can maintain reasonable time
diversification, or after a period of insuring the risk during
I *This was, in fact, the approximate rate and its method of
determination for the insurance of communication satellites prior
I _ t° the l°sses °f early 1984"
| s9
_._ .... _ ', _,_ "
A,
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I which he manages to set aside reserves that would o_er a
maximum liability 1_.
On the other hand, if claims are filed and insurar_e
payments made, the insurer might choose to adjust his prea_um to
reflect such payments. Consider the special case of third-party
liability insurance,for ruclear power plants. Some 105 claims
have resulted in Insuranoe payouts, for 62 of these claims, of
$32 million. This total is well under the liability limit of
$160 million for a single event, yet large enough that it could
reasonably be exp_+_d to affect rates. With no other data or
E insights, the simplest thing to do is to assume that the
historical rate of layout will be the future rate of iayout, and
F use this to set the premium. This may be referred to as the
- actua_ially determined premium, yielding an armual insurance
rate, ra , in premium dollars per insured dollar. R1t this would
I neglect the fact that insurance is being provided for a range of
liability for which there is yet no experience. _hus, a simple
I. strategy is to add a "catastrol_ic event" rate, I/N, to the
I actuarial rate, ra , to determine a total, unburdened rate, r.
That is, ,'
r =_ + r
I To this rate, overhead, profits, etc. may be added to determine
the burdened rate. This notion is the basis of FigJre 3.2, which
i is a plot of this equation.
I __.__ An example may help in understanding this figure. Suppose a
| 60
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I particular risk is insured in the swcunt of $100 mlUlon.
" Further, suppose that I00 units (launches, re_or-y_rs, etc.)
' I have been so insured to date, and _ulated claJ_ have 4
resulted in l_Ynents of $5 million. Dividing claim pmyments byj
the nurse: of insured-rick units (100) yields the actuarially
" expected liability per insured-risk un/t, $50,000. Dividing this
amount by the face value of the policy, $I00 minion, yields the
actuarlally determined unburdened rate, ra = 5 x 10-4 Nuw,
. suppose that the insurance rate actually,charged is 2 x i0-35/$,
' including burden, and that a typical burden rate for this type of
_ i insuranoe is 50 percent. _he unburdened rate is determined from
•-: Figure 2.2 to be 1.33 x i0- $, and the intersection of the
unburdened rate with the curve r = 5 x i0-4 gi,ms a :"-rspective
" on the extent to which the rate is subjectively, verses
J
" actuarially, determined. In the example shown, rates are largely
L
determined subjectively. Finally, suppose that 200 mx_h
activities are insured per year. _he "set-aside" time for risk
diversification is therefore appraximately 6 years. By plotting
data for different insuranoe "product lines" on this figure, an ' :
understanding of "standard practice" can be obtained.
Another comparison that can be made using Figure 3.2
involves the time accepted for diversification of risk.
. Analyzing data presented in Secti_, 4, it appears that
. ] diversificati_, in the nuclear-power plant industry, dependi_,9 on
i
the imler, takes place over a period of from under one year to
"_I eighteen years, in the marine industry about 2.2 years, and in
-_" the aviation industry about thirty-two years are provided for the
I _ diversification of a maximum-liability event. The space industry _ ,.
] 986003762-067
!I to date appeers significantly diffe.-_at. _be time for withir_
riskdiversificationalgpearsto be in excessof I00 ?ears. _i_
could mean (11 that insurersperceivethat they are insuring
agairwt an "Im[x_slble"event or (21that they are currently
diversifyingac_ass risksas _iI as populationand time. To the
extent that the lattercase is true, premiumsmay rise as Sl_Ce
I activities increase and spaceliability insurance becomes a
_roauct line."
%,
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7 Insurance provided to the four industries is effected
° several oommonalities. 'themaximum exposure in aach in_mtry is
[ high and well above the $50 million that was the median limit of
i liability insurance (including excess and umbrella insurance)
carried by respondents to the Oost-of-Risk Survey. In fact, only
5.7 % of respondents to the Cost- of-Risk Survey carried limits
above $200 million. [143 Union Carbi& , with $5 billion worth
_ of assets, and facing $15 billion worth Of damage suits from the
_: : recent disaster in Bhopal, India has only $200 million worth of
_ umbrella protection. Relatively little actuarial data in the
_' four inckmtries is available and therefore the statistical
analysis that is used by underwriters of high volume low unit
exposure risks such as autos, life, or dwellings is inapplicable.
Rates are set subjectively, and based on judgement.
4.1  wer [1,2]
An average nuclear power plant pays approximately $400,000
annually for nuclear liability insurance. The maximtmlamount of
liability insurance per plant pez _ncident is $160 million. If
the average nuclear pl&nt purchases a $160 mill::_npolicy at an
annual premit,n of $400,000 then the rate is $.0025 per dollar of
, _ur_mce.
Cumulative liabil1_y premiums collec___dfrom 1957 tl_
i 1983 have amounted to approximately $260 million. Refunds made
|
{ under the Industry Credit Rating Plan (described in Section 3.1,above) from 1967 through 1983 total pproximately $24 million[l]
I __ Claims paid out for nuclear liability damages amount to about $32
%
ri 64 ,
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II million. Clo6e to $30 -_lllm went tG _ clalus arisir_, from
the 1979 incident at T_ree Mile Island.[3] Table 4.1 and
i
Figure 4.1 depict premiums, claim3 and refunds.
!
_%BLE 4.I _ LIABILITY _ -- PREMIIR_, CLAIMS,
V _ (T_CUSAN_ GF _ YEAR DOLIARS)
YEAR LIABILITY (XAIM EXPENSE PREMIIR
I PREMIUM A_DIOR LOSS PAYMF/T_* REFUNDS***
i, 1957-1975" $ 74,007* $ 1,493 $ 8,0311976 15,352 193 1,682
1977 17,533 444 1,951
I- 1978 19,184 45 2,157
Il 1979 20,316 29,452 2,055
1980 23,002 372 850
1981 27,521 7 1,6_
i 1982 30,256 290 2,302
1983 33,100 (EST.) - 3,250
7 TOTAL 260,271 32,296 23,930
S3URf_: __ INSURANCE FACTS AND FIGII_ 1984, AMERICAN
NUG2AR _ _EBSRTS
*RE_ GROSS_ PREMIUMFRC8 INCEP_GN 'K) N_'EM_ER
30, 1975. PREMr0M FIGURES _ FRCR 1976 _cr_]H 1983
_ A_%L GROSS _ PREMI[RS.
**IN SEVERAL CACES _E SfERf_ GAVE _E DATE GF INCIDENT AS A
SI:_ANCF _ YEAI_S. WH]_ _I_I_A.T_ _I:I_E (I_mLIM
EXPE_-'E_ __ _ BE _ IN _ FIRST YEAR OF
_ TIA_ R_.IOD _.
***PREMIUM REFUNDS ON PREMIIRS _ i0 YEARS PRIOR _"D
REFUND.
I _be premium charge per m/llion of insurance, at eac_ layer
I of inst,,-ance is presented in Table 4.2. Claims within each layer
are indicated in Table 4.2 as well as the actuarial rate (ra),
I the burdened rate (r), and the set-aside period. Nuclear
insurance time diversiflcat_ is illu_:tratedin Figure 4.5.
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I4.2Ocean_ _[4]
| Lloyds pre_/u_ and cla.ins in marine insurance are presented
!
_ in Table 4.3 and graphedin Figure4.2. Net premiumswrittenin
{ oceanmarine insuremoein the U.S. is displayedin Table 4.4.
_ I _ 4.3 LtOYD'S _ A_D _ IN MARINE(MILL!C_ OF CORP_ YEAR UXZd_S*)
-!
i_ 1980 2,670 N/A
_ 1979 2,370 2,300
i 197s 1,830 1,670
_-._. 1977 1,670 1,490
1976 1,530 1,350
" 1975 1,440 1,260
-: _I 1974 1,450 1,360
'-" ,, t
_ _: 1983 _ R_3_
-_ _ LID_' S MARITIME
*_ PROM POUN_ STERLII_} BASI_ ON $2.40
I.
TABLE 4.4 NET _ WRITTEN IN _ MARINE _ BY
U.S. _ (MIILIC_ OP O/RRENT_ _)
6I
_ IN U.S.
I 1983 $1,096 1.01%82 ,101 06%
1981 $1,127 1.13%
1980 S!,065 i.]/%• i979 $i, 009 1.12%
197 8 $1,000 1 •22%
SOURS: BEST'S _ AND A_, 1984
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FIGURE4.2 PI"_IUMAND CLAIMSSTATISTICSIN MARINEUNDERWRITING
" AT LLOYD'SOF LONDON
SOURCES: LLOYD'SMARITIMEYEARBOOKIgB3 INSURANCEREGTSTER
I
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!J The..foll(_i_ is based on the annual re_rt of the Standard,
I a BrltiEh P & I club. _he statistics are for the 1980/81
policyyear.
l Limitaf Ireurance-$3KI,000,000
pr_/ums=$41,120,753
Number of ships=f911
Premium ship-S11 517per
W
Premium per ship per rail/ion=S56
!
l_e_ by layer
First layer of $6,000,000 '|
_"btalpremiums= $41,120,753
[ mires reir_urao_e
premiums = _. 879 o449
35,241,304 premiums for first layer of
_,000,o00
Premium per ship per million=S3,074
Claims less pool and reinsurance recoverie_ $20,801,503
Average claim per ship=S10,885
layer $375,000 excess of $6,000,000
"_ Reinsurance Pzemiums=$5,879,449 premiums for second $375,000,000
Prmni_ pership=S3,077
Prenium per ship per million=S8
. Claims statistics=NA
Sufficient data were available for the first $6 million
worth of coverage, however, claims statistics were not available
• _ for the $375 millian in excess of $6 million layer. Therefore
only the set-aside period for the first $6 million was cmmputed.
An important _servatiun may be made by comparing premiums
charged in the lower layer with premitm%scharged in the upper
layer. Per ship premitm per million dollars of coverage for the
I first $6 million anount to approximately $3,074. In the second
layer of coverage the premi_ per ship per is $8. Most of the
[ _ anticipated risk is inthe lower layer of insurance.
I 70 "
1986003762-075
| '
Claims
i Premi_ in Claims in per Set-aside_4_]er thotmam_ r thousands Unit • Period
First 86
I million $35,241 .0031 $20,802 $10,885 .0018 2.2 yrs
The data is plotted in Figure 4.6.
i
I _he data worlcNide aviation data. [5,6]following
are
Maximum exposure is estimated to be $380 million per event.In the
I U.S. airlines obtain liability policies of appr_imately $600
I million. It is assumed that the limits on policies in other
countries are somewhat low_r because often the monetary value of
I human life in court settlements is lower in other countries.
ThUS an average worldwide figure is estimated at $380 million.
I An estimate of the average number of departures has been
I based on the total long and short haul departures between 1.974
through 1978.[5] An average premium of $19,000 per thousand
I departures by dividing the total liability premiums
is estimated
collected over the six years from 1978 through 1984 ($968,673
I thousand) by the estimated number of departures in thousands over :
the period (51,000). _e burdemed insurance rate is then
per dollar of insurance.
,! Average claims per 1,000 departure_ is estimated by taking
: total liability losses worldwide during the six years from 1978
I through 1984 (576,007 thousand) and dividing by the estimated
I _ number °f departures (inth°usands) during that time peri°d
| 71
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• I (51,000). _he actuarlally determln_ rate _, is derived by4
dividing average claims per thousand departures, by total
, coverage.
I LIABILITY r (22tD4S* CIAD_ _SIDE
(0005) PER _ • a PERIOD
; I $968,673 5X10"5$576,007 $11,294 2.971/0"5 32 years
*over a six year period
I **thousand departures
Plotting the data as in Figure 4.4 or cu_[_cing N reveals
I
• that the set aside period is 32 years.
o _ _ The data used are displayed in Table 4.4 and presented in
graph form in Figure 4.4. Table 4.6 displays pre_du_s and claims
in aviation insurance written by Llo_ds, Table 4.7 shows net
. premiums written in aviation in the U.S. and Table 4.8 shows
• pr_u_ and losses in aviation liability insur_mce wr'..tten by
UoS. insurers.
TABLE 4.5 W_RI/3WII)EAVIATION SIPEISTICS
YEAR PASSENGER NUMBER OF TOTAl,LIAB_ITY TOTAL
K_ AIRCRAFT LOSSES_ LII_ILITY
(BILLIONS OF KM) ACCIDENTS (THODSANDS OF PREMIUMSi YEAR (TOOS
DCUaU i CU  NT
I YEAR$)
1983 N/A N/A $ 87,028 $184,789
11982 1,144 23 204,941 175,471
I I 1981 I,117 18 12,922 168,136
I1980 1,089 21 38,175 152,570
11979 1,060 31 160,215 139,208
• l 11978 936 25 72,726 148,499
I SCEIIK_:SIGI_, ECONOMIC STEDIES, WCRLD AVIATION AND AVIATION
" I I INSURANCE, NO. 61 JUNE 1984, SWISS RE
• l] _DTAL LOSSES: K_.I.F_A_D INJURED PASSENGER5 INCIXI)ING
1986003762-077
_I
L
I
-., 1'00
t_ _ 6
_ 180160
H _J_ ..... Averaoe tot 1 Ltebt|tt..),
80 ' E / - Losses
"_ h Average 3rl P_rt'
o _ ! q L,.b,i,' Losses
1_ 1981 1980 1979 1978
FIGURE4.3 PREMIUMAND LOSS STATISlICSFOR ALL AVIATIONCATEGORIES-U.S.INSURERS
LOSSESARE INCURREDLOSSESINCLUDINGALLOCATEDCLAIM EXPENSES
PRD|IU_ ARE NET DIRECTPREMIUMSWRITTEN
,p
LIJ
73
1986003762-078
I
I
I
I 24O _.!
I 22O 1.1 .
I 2OO t.O
'1 ,o ............... t ..... o., .
I S_. _.
. 120 0.6 _
6O 0,3 :
k
Q
40 . 0.2
! ..... 4--::--.......
20 t 0.1
0 i , L O.O
1 1978 1979 CALENDAR1980 YEAR1981 1982 i983
1
FIGURE4.4 '/CRLD'.]IDEAVI._TIO_;STATISTICS
1986003762-079
I
I
I
I _ 4.6 LLOYD'S PREMIUMS AND _ IN AVIATION INSURAN(_(MIILIQNS OF CURRDE IX][Z,R_*)
] YEAR _
1981 $309 N/A0 626
1979 559 564
1978 385 388T
1977 349 346
" 1976 349 336
1975 319 309
1974 334 323
_: 1983 IN_JRAN(_ R_GIS]3_
LIDYD'S MARITIME YFARBOQK
_, *_ FRCI_PCENDS STERLING _ ON $2.40 TO
THE_.
TABLE 4.7 NET __ _ IN AVIATION INSJRANCE BY U.S.
I_SURERS (MILLIONS OF _ YEAR _)
" YEAR NET PREMIUMS PERC22¢tOF TOTAL
'4 4
_ WR/TT_ NET RREMIUM
: WRITTEN IN U.S.
d
1983 $302 .28%
_ 1982 $254 .24%
_- 1981 $209 .21%
1980 $171 .18%1979 $147 .16%
1978 $156 .19%
-I SOURCE: BEST'S _ AND AVEPJGF_, 1984
L__
1
I
4
D'
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. _ 4.8 I'RDtltLRS AND LOSSES: AVIATION LIABILITY
I U.S. _ (_CUSN_I_ OF _ YEARDOLLARS)
++
2 2
THIR) PARTY TOTAL _IRD PARTY3
] LIABILITY LIABILITY LIABILITY LIABILITY
0
I1982 115,095 45,578 69,779 14,433
1981 136,926 56,328 76,116 21,200 !_
].980 114,691 48,156 91,651 19,024
1979 83,537 35,670 .88,599 17,900
; _ 1978 83,819 36,728 74,189 25,108
SCER_: AVIATION S'IP_TISTICS(LASSIFICATION RESISTS ON WRITTEN
_ i BASIS, POLICY YEARS 1978-1982, AVIATION INS/RANCE
• RATING B[m_AU+
I_ES SfR_ELED AIRLINES, INDU_ AID RLg_, FLYING("
SERVICE, MANUFACTURERS, AND PRIVATE P__.Aql]_ I'_.
2
: DKIt+D_ _ PASSIble:R, FJBLIC AND FROFERTY DAMAGE
j LIABILITY.
3iNa/_ES PUBLIC AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY.
Each payload p_is approximately $i00,000 for $500 million ::
of liability insurance. (This varies depending on the number of
the flight.) Under the INTEC facility, the maximum_loads
on
liability for one payload is $500 million,[7] for more than one
pm]IcaC..maximum lidbility protection is $750 million.[8]
I There is no claims data, so r =0 and the rate must b'_seta
'i entirely subjectively (r=I/N). The current rate per dollar of
insuranoe Is $.0002 (taking $I00 thousand divided by $500
. I _ million), and the number of activities owe_ which insurers will _ ,,
l 76
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I FIGURE4.5 DETERMINATIDI_OF NUCLEARINSURN_CETIMEDIVERSIFICATIO_I
", |
DI
r,
1986003762-082
!
|
Iii
I
ORIGINALPAGZ |S
I OF POOR QUALITY
I
Illl f I¢'BII11DI_1llgll
i '-: . v _,v _vv v
" _'+., _ ._.__. _._, q..._
-. _ ""N. _ "_- -._: \ .... \ "M.I:.:,, :,, .-,, :,, +_ _ .,, ,---
_. ",, " -_,32?,-_ I III "_,,...__ ", ,,+,,,'_ . I LP.
_ I , _ll : • .: :- .... w_rl ,t.l
-,,_..,.,i,m'=m=_=,,===..! ! I
] %-_,,.._ ",,
=4 q _-. r"n4
+ " ' ' ,,.LLL
,., Lto4'
] ..,0., ,,..... ,,,,,..-,"_=,,,,° , __-,,#,-,i, -,1 , I:'O' 'T PJ",+- FI:U!:E4.7 DET.,..._,.,._.TIOI_OF #.V ATIDNINSURA,_ICETI;IEDIVERSIFICATION
i
I
,,, +
1986003762-084
" FIGURE4.8 DETERMI_TIO/_OFSPACEINSURANCETIMEDIVERSIFICATION
I._•
_ _ 80
......." 986003762 085
|
set aside the amount of a maximum liability event is 7,500. Thus
I the set-aside period, if there are an average of 20 insured]L:mylcmc]s per year is 375 _ears, if 50 payloads _ _vecage per
i year, the set-aside period is 150 _.ars.
f
iJ 4.5 aeaeJm/at. to theB: ti Zrs e
Bolicyholders surplus is the net worth of the insurance -
- _ and serves as an extra backup to a cumpany's reserves so
money will be available to pay catastrophic or unexpected severe
losses.[9] Policyholders surplus may be considered a measure of
_try assets related to the ebility to insure because the
limit to the amotmt of premiums an insurer will write is a
funcLion of its policyholders surplus. The exact relaticmship is
" often debated but an insurer is c(msidered overextended it the.
ratio of its net written premiums to policyholders surplus is
| more than 3 to I.[i0] Theories have advanced the hypothesis that
an optimum ratio fo[ property insurers would be 2 to 1 and for
casualty,insurers 1 to I. [ii] Statistics frum Best's Aggregates
i and Averages reveal tha_ total policyholders surplus was ::;
$65,600,000,000 and the total net written premitus amounted to
$i08r983,000,000 at year end 1983 in the U.S.[12] The aggregate
i ratio of net premiums written to policyholders surplus then was
1.66 in 1983 in the U.S.
i One insurance typically insures lires ofcu_any many
business and draws in premi_ frum each line. Policyholder_
I surplus is available to back all these lines of business and is
I not necessarily distributed toeach line. _,.e ca_p_ n_y _maintain total net written premiums to pelicyholders surnlus as a ..
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'_ole at a oertaln ratio and not necessarily maintain this ratio
• I over each line of business.1
•m_ver, one may arrive at a _oogh appr_imationof
I policyholders surplus associated with the aviation and marine
: | _ies _] assuming that these industries maintained the ratio|
that the insurance industry as a whole did-l.66- and calculating
| tim l_olicTholderssurplusrequiredto proax_ a ratio of 1.66. [
1 i
(Policyholders surplus = net premium/ 1.66). _ccording to !b
i Best's Aggregates & Averages net premiss written for ocean
i marine insurance totaled $1,096,231,000 and for aircraft totaled$301,584,000 in 1983. On the basis of these statistics it is
estimated that policyholders surplus approximates $660,380,120
for ocean marine insurance and $181,677,000 in aircraft insurance.
I It must be stressed that net premiums written in each of these
. | lines is a very small peroentage of total net premitms written
4
(net premi_,s written on aircraft were only .3% of the total net
I premiums written and net premiums written on ocean marine were 1%
of total in the U.S.). In actuality the insurance industry has
I substantially more policyholders surplus available to claims, :
I because the oompany's total policyholders surplus is probably :
much greater: the above is an approximation of policyholders
I that might be associated _ith aviation or ocean marine.surplus
A_other measure of capacity, known as large line capacity,
I refers to an insurer's ability to provide a large amount of
I insurance on a single loss exposure. In some states, regulati-_zs
prohibit insurance cx_panies from writing nee for its own account
I 82 Ip
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I policyholders or.any one loss exposure. (One insurer may write a
large line if it keeps its retention at 10% to its surplus and
I reinsures the balance.)[I0] Applying this rule to the.estimates
i of policyholders surplus able, indicatesthat appr_imately $18
million of capacity may be available for aircraft risks and $66
million for ocean marine risks for a single loss exposure from
U.S. insurance oom_eso _his also is a gross approximation and
I it must be noted in reality companies may be allowed 10% of total
] policyholders surplus (as opposed to. the above estimated
policyholders surplus targeted for aircraft or marine risks) but
--_ __ often take on exposure in amotmts substantially less than 10% of
policyholders surplus.[13]
r
i
]
i
]
I
I
!|
I
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l5. _ FOP._ It_OV_ION OF
I
5.1 mblic _ _m_
I _ere are several reasonswhythe Federal goverrmentshould
be concerned with third party liability protection for privateI
users of government facilities and private contractors to
6
I government. In the event of a catastrophic aocident, private
entities could be subject to devastating liabilities if it were
l judged that they were liBble _mder actuil (causal relationship
between damage or injury and the acts or failures to act of a
user is proven) or absolute liability (liabilitywithout proof of
fault or negligence)standards.[l,2] To the extent that this
possibility discourages the development of activities or
industries considered to be in the national interest, a
limitation of liability is in the public interest. Gove_t
reduction of the risk of investment in new technology is
recognized as often necessary to encourage the development of
such technology. Such was the rationale behind the limitation of
:] :liability set for the ,nuclearindustry by the Price-Anderson_¢t.
On the other h_nd, a limitation of liability that allows victims
to go tm_ted is not in the public interest. Bus another
i
Feder%l concern is that victims might _ted forgo
damages sustained, either if adequate protection is not available
i to those who migh_ cause damage to third parties,[I] or if there
l is a limitation on liability without indemnity provisions for
1
damages beyond the limitation. Averting eithe[ of those two
84
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• I interest. _herefore it may be considered in the public interest
that NASA ensure adequate financial protection against the
I possibility of third [:artydamages.
i NASA now ensures a_equate protection by requiring sl_ce
vehicle users, with some e=ceptions, to purchase insurance to
I protect the U.S. governmm_ as well as _ves. Since
private insurance capacity is limited, if there are damages that
exceeded the level of private insurance available then NASA's ['
h
promise to indmmify the space vehicle usgr _ this ammmt is
consistent with assuring the vic_:im of _tion and
protecting the user from disasterous financial consequences of
its use of the space vehicles, both of which m_ be considered to
! be _ the public interest. Without this agreement on the part of
-- NASA to ir_emnify damages beyond the level of protection offered
" by omm_rcial insurance, the space vehicle user might find the
threat of disasterous damages, although remote, a deterrent to
use of space vehicles.
_wever, if the cost of (_taining financial protection is\
_ high, tlve ir_urance requirementmay itself pose a deterrent to
_ space activity. If the cost of dDtaining third party liability
insurance would discourage space activity, it may be in the public :
. interest, for the Federal government to provide insurance.
. Space activity, in general, is considered to be in the
national interest and thus t.herem_,al of any deterrent to space
activity may be said to be in the public interest. It is not
l within the of this to that is inscope study prove space activity
the national interest: however, the decisions of the U.S.
government to date with regard to the space program have been
%
m
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mI consistent with this premise. F_ver, not all space activities
• I are in the national interest. Space activites that fit the
following criteria are not in the national interest:
I The activity imposes undo risk on persons or property
on earth or in space.
• _he activity adversely im[mcTm the environment, or imposes
undo risk on the envirmmmmt, either on the earth or in
space.
I _e activity is in violation of international law or
treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory.
_e activit_ is in violation of domestic (Federaland state)
law and the Constitution.
_be activity threatens national security, it imposes undo
risk on Gove_t property, and it seeks to overthrow the
| Gove_t by force.
J
Further, although measures of economic worth of an activity
] may provide quantitative data to aid in the determination of
J
which activities are in the national interest, or the ranking of
] activities aococding to economic value, such measures _ould
." require a cu_:_erscme case by case analysis and would be subject]
to different value judgements, opinions and political interests.
I It is rec(mmended that determination of whether a space activi_!
is in the national interest, for purpose of determining which
l :parties receive federally provided insurance not include measures
i of ecunu_c worth.
In regard to assuring _tion to potential victims, it
I seems that the NASA requirement that insists on a user or users
purchasing one policy to protect themselves and the Federal
I government regard/__ssof who is at fault (except if contractor is
at fault, in which case NASA will iTx_mnify,[3]) will
,_ facilitate _J_ c]'ims procedure by reducing the number of parties
= . , _ *-.
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that could be sued.
5.2 Interpretation of Price-Anderson Rct
The Price-Anderson Act is one excellent example of
government policy that was Int_ to assure c_tion to
potential victims (at least up to the maximum limitation on
liability of $560 million)and to encourage participation of
private industry in the development of a new technology, nuclear i
i
energy, by reducing potential exposure to liability. By
committing the government to provide: indemnification for
potential damages in excess of coverage held by the nuclear
plants up to $560 million the gove_t made certain that at
least that much would be available to compensate victims. There
is, however, an uncertainty as to who would bear the risk of
damages in excess of the limit of liability, the victims or the
federal govermment through t_he subsequent enactment of
legislation. For claims beyond $560 million, Congress made a
vague promise to take appropriate steps. Another advantage to
the potential claimant is that_ under the 1975 amendment, the
claims procedure is simplified and the number of parties that may "1"
be sued is limited. By limiting liability of the nuclear :.f
plants to $560 million it protected the plants from the potential
of disasterous financial liabilities. The limitation of
liability and the possibility of indemnity have reduced financial
risk to the nuclear utilities and thus might have resulted in a
greater number of _4_eratingfacilities than would otherwise be
thecase.[41
Before 1954, the Federal government had an absolute monopoly
i
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I on atomic energy _velo_ment. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was
intended to encourage the development of atomic energy by the
private sector. However, the private sector was not willing to
i invest heavily because of enormous potential ]labilities.
Indeed, testimonies in hearings on the Price-Anderson Act
I indicate that industry did not want to become involved in the
nascent nuclear power industry without a commitment on the part .
I of t_he gove_t to limit liability and provide for 1
l indemnification.[5,6]
One frequently heard objection to the Price-Anderson Act on
the part of critics of nuclear was that the unwillingnesspower
of the industry to assume the full risk of liability was evidence
-! that the operation of nuclear plants was inherently unsafe.
i Others contend that this unwillingness was not due to a lack of
absolute conviction as to safety, but was consistent with a
I belief that there was _unextr_neiy remote possibility that an
accident would occur, but that liability for the accident would
be disastrous.[7]
l It has also been suggested that the indemnification _
pr_ision may have impeded gr(_th in the primary level of
I insurance. By entitling nuclear utilities to indemnification for
liability i_curred but not insured in the primary or secondary
I .layer, Price _nderson may have given utilitles a disincentive to
l purchase more liability than required by the Act. In the same
vein, insurers, who have not been enthusiastic about nuclear
I liab_1_ity insurance in the first place, haven't ofr ed much
?8
nuclear liability insurance as they might otberw_: bermuse the
nuclear utilities haven't pressed them to increase the supply of ,
| 88
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I ir,suran_.[4]
I 5.3 _al_J/J_ _ _i_._iJ_l JJ_arJ_X_
i Availability of insurance for any given risk is influenoed
by t,e rate, profitability of a given line, loss experience, and
I state of the insurance industry. Capacity is also influenced by
perception of risk, which is itself influenced by the degree to . ,
which technical problems are understood and the exposures are _:
i
clear.
I The amotmt of space liability insurance would increase if
more cor_es participated in providing insurance capacity and
if each companytook a larger exposure. With 9ood lo6s
experience, increased pres/ums or improved terms and conditions,
available insurance would be likely to increase.
Without performing an extensive survey of insura_nce
companies in the U.S. and in London it is impossible to determine
the extent that insurance capacity will respond to increases in
rates. However, discuEsions with underwriters s:ggest that
insurance premit_s would have to increase :_ "iu_ntly before .,
more third party l_bility capacity can be. ::_ or.
I Experience with Sl_Ce liability has to _L_ _- _ositive.
With the exception _f the _ssian satellite re, _£] there
I have been no liability payments for damage _ed by bpace
i _j_ to date. Over 486'0spacecraft are currently in orbit.[9]
While it may seem there is a _ignificant amount of experience
that has borne out the safety of space launches,the premium
volume in space liability instuance is small especially in
relation to t/_esize of the maximum liability exposure. So far, _IJ
3[ \
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I in the U.S. no claims have been paid so experience is ezcellent,
i but at current rates it will be ove_-a century before insurers
will have collected enough premilJ to cover ane maximum liability
loss.
•m_ever, the _vaila_i±Ity of satellite liability in_ura_e
I is influenced by more than simply _ experience in the satellite
"- liability market. Experience in the _ysical damage insurance
will effect _a_cit_ "hat is available for liability and so will
the current Late of pr 9fitabili_ of _he marine and aviationi
markets and experlerk_ in -_heinsurance me.rketin general _nd thei
I, liabi__ity maz_et in par' =cular.
It se_.s reasonable to suggest that shrinking capacity in
the physical damage market that is resulting as a number of
insurance ccmpanies close their satellite insurance deFartments
is synorr/n,ouswith decreasing capacity in liability ir_suranee.
• To properly understand liability exposure the ,_derwrlter must
understand the p_sical damage exposure. Reinsurers are dropping
out of both f/_eaviatior and satellite market. U.S. insurance
. _ies will not take risks without reinsurance. C_es that _.,4
. are withdrawing from the market in satel]ite physical damage (or
- those that have ch(_en not to ,_.nter),will not likely maintain an
expertise in any aspect of space insuranoe.
Capacity appears to be shrinking in space liability
insurance and rates incre_asing. One case in point is a recent
policy covering in-orbit liability exposure. _e premium for
I this policy increased 1,000% over _ previous policy and the
I _ capacity was so c_n-trained that t/_ ._ximumavailable exposure
I 90 •
1986003762-095
I halved from $500 million to $250 million. _ re.m_ed policy
• ordered one year L'unead of three, l_m_t losses in _e physical
P
h, damage _:ea may have influenced peroeptic._.s of risk, causing
i insurers to question the ext_,_ntto which technical pr_lems are
:_-_erstood. Insurers may reel that uncertainty is higher than
I previously believed, causing many to drqp
and tillsc_d be out
of both l_/slcal damage and liabJllty insur&_c_ and causlrg
I others to reduce their lines and charge a higher premium.
I Kigher ___rs for liability insurance is in part m, attempt to
r_e !oe_es in the I_sica/ damage area.
In th_ U.S. there a well developed "umbrella" liability
is
market which provides coverage, and in fact, large amounts of
ooverage for the various ik_ilities of U.S. co_orations and
I businesses, An umbrella coverage is intended to cover
cata_trophic events faced by business. Several U.S. o_mpanies
I c_m usually combine to provide up to $200 million :n oowerage.
However, this capacity is not available to satellite users, due
l to exclusions in reinsuranoe treaties (for umbrel!_ c_erages)
which exclude aviation risks. Bence even if umbrella .,4
underwriters were inclined to consider satellite coverages, they
I could not 9ffer their usual capacity, only a net line, which
would not be of much use. In addition, the current rates of
I satellite insurance _id be too low. Regardless of the typ_ of
I tiE,k, the minimum pre_it_ per million dO:_ars of exposure for
umbrella c_werage is $500. Some reinsurers have minimum premiums
I of $750 or $i000 per million. Present placements of satellite
in_uranoe are priced at approximately $200 per million.
[ _ Capacity and pricing for satelllbo c_eragewill also be _ ,
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I influenced by the current _-taceof profitability of the marine
and aviation markets. The logical potential sources of capocity
in satellite insuranoe are the aviation and marine markets. _e
T
mar_e market is n_ for its ability to respond to the needs of
capacity type risks. In s_ipping, the marine market, led by
underwriters at LloFds of London, and the underwriters at British
insurance companies, slxx_ssfully put together the insurance
c_Jerage for the first large super tankers. %_en tlese were
- first introduced, they posed considerable challenges and problems
both _rom technical and capacity standpoints. In addition to
{ accepting capacity type risks, marine underwriting recfaires the
exercise of judgement and recogniti_1of different exposures,
because of the many factors that marine underwriters c(msider in
underwriting various risks. Marine underwriters consider the
risk and whole en_-irornentin which the risk is placed. Factors
influencing rate setting .nclude mode of transport, number and [
location of stops the vessel makes, reputation of shipper,
container, etc. A marine underwriter m_gt constantly analyze
:
the differences in the same overall class of account. _is type
of rigor in analyzing exposures sets marine underwriting apart
from such irL_uranceareas as h_<_ners, auto, or life, which use
actuarial data to set rates. _, their very training, marine
underwriters have the inclination to move into new areas and to
move into new exposures. They are useO to considering different
,o exposures every day.
Space liability insurance has been placed largely in t_m
Lond_, market [I0] while q. insurers generally consider the
"v_,[
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'_ | current rates too low and have been reluctant to participate in
I
this area. The intrinsic differences between the Imndon and U.S.
, markets explain why capacity is more readily forthcoming from
London. An overview of these differences is presented in
° AppendixA.
• 5.4
, Determining the maximum potential liability loss that a _
: space vehicle could cause is not feasible because there really is
no up[_r limit on potential clama@es, h=cidents of_ untold
magnitude are possible by a cascading of unlikely events. Other
activities occur daily that also could under certain
circumstancescauseenormousdamages.
According to estimates there is a remote possibility that an
accident at a nuclear power plant could cause several billion
{
dollazs of damage. However, in over twenty-seven years, total
: damages from incidents at power plants have totalled $32 million.
Commercial jetliners have an impressive safety record. In the
five year period between 1974 and 1978, 33 total losses
(excluding war and sabotage accidents) out of 9,500,000 ";
departures of long-haul jets were recorded and 36 total losses
occurred out of 31,450,000 departures of short-haul jets.[15]
_ven more impressive is the degree to which airlines have avoided
• the sort of damage which would result in third party claims. _e
; t'eason that commercial jetliners carry large liability limits is
due to the potential liability to passengers. _e worst aviation
I history, (an on ground collisi(_,y[16] occurred in
disaster in
1977 at Tennerife in the Canary Island and caused $161 million in
• __ twJdily injury and material damages.[17] One of the worst _J
93
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Jdisasters involving damage to persons and property (m the ground
was the 1982 crash of a Pan-_m Boeing 727 in New Orleans.
J Liability damages amounted to $70 million.[18] Pr(_ably the
I worst marine disaster to date, the wreck of the _moco-4:adez off
the coast of France in Iq78 has generated over $2 billion in
lawsuits.
The Federal Government has exercised range safety control
over all space vehicle launches emanating from the territories of
the United States. The purpose of this :c_ntrol is to assure the
safety of peoples and structures from risk of death, injury, or
damage from =space objects" over the entire world. The steps
taken to assure such safety are herculian, and include the
evacuation of a safety zone--land, sea, and air--arot_d all
I
j launch sites and in the d(_mrange region of each launch, the
planning of launches to avoid overflight of populated regions of
I the earth during ascent, and, as an ultimate mechanism, provision
for total destruction of the launch vehicle should the launch go
awry in a manner t/_t threatens such safety. To date, t/_
I Gove_t has achieved an excellent safety record_
Despite these precautions and the resulting safety record,
however, there re_ain a variety of scenarios traderwhich a launch
i system such as the Space Shuttle could cause extensive damage,
including injury _ de_Lh to htmans. And, although most such
I mechanisms would be extremely unlikely to occur--indeed, they
would be concocted from highly implausible scenarios--competent
I _ysicists could find mechanisms for their occurrence that would
I __ not viOlate physica_ laws" THUS, from the point of view of an
| 94
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insurer, maximum liability events are =possible," and the maximum
potential loss could be the face value of all future insurance
coverage.
More limiting, however, and considering _,y that liability
exposure related to the Space _uttle fleet, the maximum exposure
would be the liability limit per Space Shuttle flight, $750
million, times the number of Space S_uttles in the fleet, say 5,
or $3.75 billion. The Space S_uttle fleet alone could not
generate a third-party liability to insurers higher than this
am_tmt. Since the_ Fc4era! Goverrm_,t has already agreed to
losses beyond the available insurance, which is
presently available up to $750 million a flight, the maximum
liability to the Treasury if the Federal Government agrees to
provide insurance, that is: take on the first $7,50 million of
risk as well, would be the incremental exposure of $750 million
per shuttle flight. Toe gove_t is already exposed to
liabilities in excess cf $500 to $750 million a shuttle flight.
But, surely, if one such catastrophic aocidemt occurred, efforts
would be redoubled to make the occurrence of a second such event
even less likely. THUS, the possibility of third_ty liability
claims even approaching this amount is so remote that its
consideration must be treated as an academic exercise.
It is more reasonable, and informative, to ask w_at expected
value of liability night be generated by the Space Shuttle fleet.
A precise computation of this value would be very difficult, but
a simple model can provide adequate insights° Assume that
liability might arise ordy if the Space Shuttle is lost in an
_w_ uncontrolled aecident. The probability of a liability loss on
95
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l any given flight would be the product of four probabilities: (1)
l the probability that the Space Shuttle will have an accident on
at%-given flight, P, ,(2) the probability that the accident will
I oc_r in an uncontrolled manner (and thus cannot be diverted to
an area where no liability damage would occur) given that an
I
accident does occur,PU/A, (3) the fraction of the earth under the
I orbital arc that is ir_abited, f I' and (4) the probability that a
liability lcJs is incurred given that an uncontrolled accident
] occurs in am inhabited area, PL/I" In _]dition, let L be the
average or expected liability per accident that results in a
liability loss. The expected liability loss per Space Shuttle
! night is,
EtLf= PAPu/AfIPL/IL
?
It is assumed that each Space Shuttle vehicle would be involved
in only one accident and, further, that each vehicle has a useful
life of n flights. _e expected liability loss per vehicle (EL_) [
is, thus
4
ELLv=[1-(1-PA)n]Pu/AflPL/i'.7
] Assuming that no steps wou ._be take,-',to prevent a second
i accident, given the occurrence of one accident, the expected
liability loss for a fleeh of N Space Shuttles (ELLt) is
_e parameters of this equation are not known. But reasonable
I values can be used, for illustrative purposes. Choosing values:
I PA = 0.01
PU/A = 0.i
L' 96
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I P = 0.2L/I
L = $750 million
I n = I00
I N = 5
Although these are arbitrarLly chosen values, some reason omzld
I be expressed that they are probably on the conservative side,
that is, they overestimate the expected fleet liability. For
example, a 1 percent chance of an accident on any given flight is
I in concert with NASA design criteria. P U/A = 0.I is probably a
gross overestimate of this pr(_ability, n = 100 assumes that
every flight of each vehicle's expected life will carry a
commercial payload. N = 5 assumes a full, five-orbiter fleet,
! and L $750 million assumes that any incurrence of liability
- results in the maximum possible liability. Using these numbers,
ELL t= $476,000. Thus, a premitm,of $100,000--apprQximatelythe
current of third-party liability insurance--is tl_.lprice
more_
one-fifth of the expected liability generated by the entire Space
I
Shuttle fleet _er its lifetime!
| Ttds result is further ew_ that insurance premiums are
|
not determined by expected loss. _is is an expected value that
I would never occur. In reality, the Space Shuttle fleet will
generate either no liability loss at _all,or a very large loss in
the unlikely event that any loss oocurs. (Of course, a small
I loss is possible, but even less likely.) To be safe, an insurer
E
i
must set aside funds to cover a p_ent, should a loss be
I incarred. By this logic, premiums on the $100,000 areorder of
actually very "reasonable." Analysis of insurance rates in other
I _ industries indicate that the set-aside period in t_ese industries
I 97 ,
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I is significantly shorter than the set-aside period for sp_ce
i insurance. Judging by practice in othe_ _ustries, if spaceinsurance is to beom_ a product line, it would not be
unreasonable for Premium rates to rise to a level 5 to I0 times
higher than current rates.
S_wuld the Federal C_ve_t choose to provide third_
. liability insurance to Space Shuttle users, its liability
exposure would be determined by the limits cited above, tempered
by any liability assumed by commercial i6suranc_ sources.
__ 5.5 _ of l_asonabl___ness
!
Judging the pr_um rate that could be considered
unreasonable from the point of viaw of the user is a difficult
and arbitrary task. From the user's point of view the most
o reasonable premium is zero; any premium above zero is less
" reasonable. Of course, a rate of zero would be unreasonable from
others' perspectives, i.e. the insurance cug_anies, which would
not offer insurance capacity unless it could expect a reasonable
rate of return.
Once the user accepts that some ra_e must be paid, he may
I judge reasonableness by historical costs, cumparing rates with
what he is used to paying. A sudden and substantial rate
increase would likely be perceived as unreasonable to a user.
Rates that impaired the financial viability of a space
activity would certainly be cxmsidered unreasonable. High
I insurance costs might cause _'heoverall profitability of the
space venture to become low relative to other commercial ventures
I _ andmight result ina shift of investment out of space activities _J
I
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I and into terrestrial enterprises. Payment of liability p_emiums
I mI_ effect comf_titJveness of a space venture by making it less
attractive in relation to its competitors. One example would be
if a venture such as Comsat had to _ insurance costs that
provision of its services less competitive in relation to
competing terrestrial _chnologies like microwave or fiber
i optics. High insurance costs could make the venture itself
untenable as could be the case in a small business situation that
may be just starting up or a research and development venture
that is not expected to generate revenues for several years.
One may ca_sider the financial impact of several levels of
premium on a typical satelli_ mission, by cumputing the impact
of the higher costs of the missions (at higher premium levels) on
the present value of net income of the missions, and the effect
higher premiums might have on financial performance measures of
I the business entity such as per share earnings, r te of return on
I investment, return on assets, and net profit margin.
Since cummunicaticns satellite missions make up the bulk of
I space misaions subject to the liability insurance requirement, a ..
communications satellite business example is considered in order
I to illustrate potential financial impacts. In particular, Comsat
I General Corporation and ore of its planned satellite systems, the
Comstar K system, is considered, and the effects of four
I liability premium levels are indicated..
The effect on several financial performance measures was
I estimated using data from Comsat's annua/ Report for 1983 and
[ _ computing what each perfomance measure might be if Comsat had
| 99
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i _ an acklitieral ir_uranee premium of $.5 million, $1.0
million, $5.0 million and $10.0 million. Table 5.1 presents the
I results of the ccmImY_atiQns, assuming that the insuram:e oost
increases are not passed on to the consumezs.
!
|| _ 5.1 _ OF VARIOUS FREMIUM _ GN
_'S FINANCIAL _ MF_ °
i ....
Fn_NC_L VARIABLES PREMIUM _ (SlLUONS OF D(XlARS)
$.5 $i. $5. $I0.
a3MMGN _ _ 8.75% 8.7% 8.2% 7.8%
l NET PI_FIT MARGIN 11.3% 11.0% 10.6% 7.7%
ON ASSETS 4.8% 4.7% 4.5% 4.2%
., f
I
I
BASED ON D/_A FRfI4(]3MSAT,l_I_ REI_I_r1983
_e financial data (Table 5.2) on the Camstar K mission is
1 'included in Comsat's FOC filing for that mission. The satellite
T system will include 2 satellites and one in-orbit spare. Costs
I
and revenues are projected for the system.[ii] Using a discotmt
"I
rate of 10% the present value of the net inc(l,e is $15.63
million. This was compared with the present value which woul_.
result if premiums were to cost an additional $.5 million, $I.0
] million, $5.0 million, and $i0.0 million per satellite. At a $5
I
million premium the net present value was $6.58 million and at a
J $i0 million premium the value was -$2.44. (Table 5.3)present
Bowever, calculationE; used the revenue forecast assumed under
I
_ | present premium levels.
%
_] t.
l
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I _W_LE 5.3 _g_qT VALOE OF NZT I]_OME _
VARIOOS F_qIUM _
I (milli,_ of dollars)
i $ .5 $14.72
1.0 13.82
l 5.0 6.5
! 10.0 -2.44
'1
*OVER 15-YEAR P_IOD USING A D_ _ OF 10%
I
That would be val id if a communications satellite ,-
enterprise such as C(m_.at was faced with a unit elastic ckamm_d
for its se,--_ces. That is, if the _ amount of revenue would
be received at any price (if prices were increased revenue would
remain the same because quantity demanded would fall by the same
percentage), premiums of between $5 million a;_d $!0 million would
threaten the viability of the _/ssi_n, by causing the presemt
value of net income to turn negative.
t However, the cost of the satellite cc_penent is a very mnall
percentage uf tota/ c(m_unications oosts and very likely may be
_ed on to the consumers without causir_j too much concern. If
I this is the case, revenue would increase wh_j_ consumers pay
higher prices because when demand is inelastic, consumers do not
I cut hack their demand significantly when prices go up. If the
venture can pas_ on price increases to the consu_._r, the above
I _ n_ative impac_ " °n the ve_nture itse!f _Y r_°t°ccur' °r may °n/Y ._
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J negative impacts on the venture it_" _ may not occur, or may only
oocur in the short run. If premiums were to increase and demand
i is price inelastlc, _ corporation would be ab1_ to pass the eost
i of the higher premitms on to its customers without materially
affecting revenues, and the resu] ting financial performance
J measures.
The venture can pass costs on to users _ntil the cost Is
pushed beyond the cost of the next best choice, which in the case
j of c_mmunication satellites would be terrestrial systems
(microwave and fiber optics). If premiums were to cause costs to
rise to a point which would make terrestrial communications less
exLnensive than ccmm'_nication satellites, the viability of the
cfmm_icaticns satellites would be threatened.
i Dete_uning the impact of premiums _n the financial
J
viability of a missi(_] is an unsatisfactory criteria for NASA to
I employ, however, in deciding when liability insurance shou[
pzovided b5,the Federal Government, because it would requi-
J case-bl-case ana3ysis, which would be costly to administer and
sdbject to numerous imperfections. Obviously premium effects on
a venture's financial viability depends on the venture. A
premium that may not impair Comsat missions may be too high for
another venture and so there is no one "reasonable" preraium, based
on this criteria.
An alternative criteria could be the point at which
launching via a U.S. system becomes significantly more expensive
l th_ a comparable launch on a foreign system. If insuranc__ co6ts
were so hlgh t_at the7 made t_ c_t of launching a payload via
i __ the shuttle more expensive than an A_.iane launch, users would _
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i consider premium charges unreasonable and NASA might lose
potential business to its French c_mpetitors. Avoidance. of t_ds
I possibility w_uid be the national interest.
in
Presumably NASA has priced shuttle launch_ below co6t to
I attract custamers to the space transportaticm sy_:tem. It may be
J necessary to examine NASA's rationale in pricing to determine
and to what extent ada: 0._nal exists _ry be unreasonable.
I Requiring users to pay high liability insurance costs, is counter
to the original objective of maintaining ic_ laune_ prices. Any
J increase in insurance premiLms associate_ w_th the launch of
J payloads increases the cost of laun_ning the payloads to the
user and the cost of launching on the NAZA syst_m, relative t_
the c_st of launching_ via a foreign _titor. The price of an
Ariane (D_Ita class PAM-4)) launch r6u_es from $25 - $30 million;
I the price of an equivalent shuttle launch ranges fram $15 to $20
' millicm. One .may compare the two prices if third party
liability insurance for launches on t_beU.S. s_fstem were to
I increase to $.5 million, $I million, $5 million and $i0 million.
A strict c(mparison of launch prices may not be sufficient,
however, since there are other variables affecting _ for
J each of the different launch systemas.
Other measures of reasonableness m_y be used. A reasonable
I pre_Lit_ _y be set as a percent of total r_nue o_ a percent of
j payload cost or a percent of launch cost.
One approach to determinin_ w_ther third party liability
l pre_niums are reasor_%b!e is suggested by a recent survey r_ _ormed
b5' t_ Risk Planning Group and P_sk & Insurance Managemm]t
I q j
I lOd
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I Society. This survey e _uted cost-of-risk (defined in the
survey as net insuranoe premiums, Lmreimbursed loss oosts, loss
i control, loss prevention expenses and administrative cost) as a
i percentage of revenue in 33 industry groups and foLmd that it
ranged from a low of 0.11% in the finance and banking industry to
I a high of 2.47% in the transportation industry (and averaged .48%I
J
_t
over all industries).[12] Using these percentages as a criteria,
I it may be concluded that if the cost-of risk represented by the
i insurance costs of a l:articular mission were to exceed 2.5% of
the projected revenues of that mission, then the c_st of
_ I insurance is out of line with the highest percentage paid in
other industries.
!
Table 5.4 sets out costs and revenues t_hatare projected by
.: | the American Satellite CorporaLion (ASC) for a proposed
!
mission[13] (the system consists of two in-o_bit sa_ellites in
1986, three i.n-orbit satellites in 1987 and four in-orbit [
satellites and one ground spare in 1989). I-qurance costs as a
percentage of projected revenue are displayed on the last line,
and range from .06% to 2.3%. _king t_heyears 1986 and 1987, :
when ASC plans to launch a satellite each year, _ insurance
level that would amount to 2.5% of projected revenues would equal
$I million in 1986 and $2.3 million n. 1987. Projected
insurance costs are $.8 and $1.87 million in years 1986 and 1987
I respectively. An additicna/ $2 million in insurance costs in
]986 and _nother $.44 million in 1987 would bring t/_epercentage
I of knsurance oost._to revenue in those to 2.5% _mounts
years Q
beyond that level would result in insurance costs being more than
__ 2.5% of revenues and thus greater than themax_mu_ percentage of _J
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I the survey.*
i There are flaws with this technique. First it is based on
a survey which is based on a limited data set. _y, it
I cami_ers only insurance costs and revenues associated with a
particular mission and not with the entire corporation itself, as
does the Cost-of-Risk survey. It is not known what the ratio of
i insurance costs to revenues within the corporation are. Also it
is based on projected cost and revenue data. Since the
i filing was produced there is reason to believe that insurance
costs will be much higher than was pr(_ably anticipated at the
I time the filing_was written (es_ecially in the physical damage
area). Therefore there is probably less room for growth in the
insurance costs before they become 2.5% of projected revenues.
Liability insurance cost may also be considered as a
percentage of launch costs, or payi_ value. The preferred
method would be to set a reasonable premz_ as a percent of
launch cost_ since NASA can easily establ h the_- costs and
payload exit data could be mar/pulated by the prospective user.
Eharging a single premium rate for all payloads creates ;
difficulties in allocating the liability risk in an orderly and
I equitable manner. Although CFES (Continuous Flow Klectro_horesis
I Systam), flown by McDonnell Douglas and the Micr,_xjravityResearch
I * If insurance costs are depreciated over several years then
it would be appropriate to estimate the inc,ement thal would
bring insurance costs to _5% of revenues fo- the years over
I which the costs wer_ ;_epreciated. _ sum of the increments
would indicate now much of an insurance increase would bring
znsurance co6ts to 2.5% of revenue.
I qJ
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I Associates (MRA) experiment do not pay launch co6ts under the
Joint Endeavor _re_m_t, if they _re required to pay, each
I launch of its payload would cost McDonnell Douglas approximately
I $i million and MRA, approximately $300 thousand.[14] NASA also
decided to waive liability insurance reguirments in these cases,
I but if each had to lay for liability insurance at the current
rate of $i00 thousand, NcDonnell Douglas would be [:raying 10% of
I latmch costs and MRA, 33%. If a oommunications satellite launch
I c_ts on the order of $20 million: liabillty premim,s are .5% of
launch costs. If one may reasonably assume that marginal
l activities, those that are experimental and might be discouraged
by high insurance costs, use smaller, lighter payloads, then
I . tting premium rates as a percentage of launch costs would allow
marginal users to pay a more moderate premium. Insurance costs
would then be less of a barrier to marginal activities.
An important criteria then, for reasonablenessof premitms
is that the premium not be an important consideration in total i
J mission costs. An arbitrary rule of thumb could be to chose 1% :
of t_he launch costs, beyond which premium rates would be . .
considered unreasonable. In this case, McDormell Douglas would
have to pay $i0,000, MRA $3;000, and the communication satellite
owner, $200,000 for insuranoe.
I
!
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II _is section discusses options available to the government
for the provision of third-party liability insurance to space
the chooses to make suchusers, if government protection
available. These o_tions are viable because of two key factors:
I. The 9._ liability ]eneratedby most space activities
is virtually nil. _hus, in the _ong term, premiums on
the order of those currently paid will recover expected
losses, and there is a great _ of freedom available
for the structuring of rates.
2. There are several precedents for government provision of r
insurance, and these could provide models for the
provisi_ of third-party liability insurance to space
users.
6.1 Organizational _ for F__ _
Many different organizational structures are possible for
= Federally provided third-party liability insurance for space :
vehicle users. B_ use of this flexibility, choices should be
"4
made carefully and with due consideration of the results. It
w_,id seem reasonable that the chosen organizational structure
should strive toward the following objectives:
I. It should not create a barrier to commercial space
activities.
2. It should not be tied to Congressional decision making.
3. It should not constitute a burden on the Treasury.
4. It should promote availability of insurance to all
qualified potential space vehicle users, large and small. _j
109
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I5. Bates should be as objectively determined as possible;
such insurance should be administratively simple and
[ require no case-by-case decisions.
I 6. It shottldnot c(m_ete with the private insurance industry.
7. It should be stable in the long term.
I A proposed organizati_ml structure could be evaluated
against these objectives. Five alternative structures are
l considered below.
| I. _ _ _ Trot Fund --Under this
concept, the government would create a Space Insurance
I _gency (SIA) to provide liability (and perhaps other)
insurance for space activities. The SIA would collect
I premiums for insurance provided. These premiums would
! be used to offset the cost of administering the SIA and
to pay any claims that might arise. Excess premitms,
I those beyond administrative costs and claims, would be
placed in a trust fund to cover potential future
I claims. The Treasury would be liable only for that
I portion of claims that might exceed the magnitude of "4
the trust fund. As soon as the trust fund becomes large
I enough, potential liability to the Treasury would
essentially be elim_ted. At such time as sufficient
l funds are available, the SIA could reduce its premiums
I and/or provide an incx_e to the Treasury.
2. _ _ -- Under this alternative, the govern-
I ment would provide "group insurance" by purchasing a
commercial policy covering its launches on an annual,
I 110
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i rather than a per flight basis. _e cost of this
policy _xtld then be allocated across space users
I according to their use of the lam_h systems. The key
advantage of this alternative is that m_oh a policy may
I be obtainable at a lower premium than policies that are
I purchased for individual flights.
3. _ _ -- Under this concept, the insurance
industry "_ould be called upon to prairie space user
I liability L_uranoe, but in les#er amounts. Private
_ insurance sources would provide the bottom layer of
insurance, say $I00 million per activity, with the [
govermmant providing insurance .or higher layers, say
$i00 million to $500 million. A premit_ would be
i charged for the upper layer of insurance, but as in the
case of other layered insurances, the premiums for the
upper layer would be substantially lower than that for
the lower layer. Alternatively, NASA co01d retain the
] bottom layer of exposure for a fee, and obtain or :
require the user to obtain commercial insurance to cover _ ,,
the upper layers.
4. _ _ -- Under this approach, users would self-
insure by agreeing to pay a retrospective premitm Jn
i case of an accident. This arrangement could be
structured in a similar manner to the secondary level
of insurance, of the nuclear industry.
5. _ Insurance fa_m_ -- Under this concept, the
government would establish a captive insurance company
111 ",).=
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II have set up. A "captive" run under the aegis of NASA
i w_Id have the advantage of NASA's engineering
expertise. It would be available to offer coverages
I much broader than L_hatavailable from the regular
insurance market. It would be available to play a key
I role in the event of a capacity crunch in the insurance
I market. It most likely would be able to offer more
competitive premiums--and like all captives, would be
I able to take advantage of reinsurancearrangements on
any risks that it might decide to take. It could a/so
I serve as a proving ground for U._. underwriting
I expertise in space projects.
The second and fourth options are menti(med for
cx_mp]eteness, but are not suggested because of their
disadvantages, which include difficulty in setting rates and
inability to identify who should make retrospective payments in
I the event of a claim, be use of a group policy would present
difficulties unless all users were required to insure under the
group policy. Otherwise, commercial coverage offered outside the
group policy for l(wer pre_i_s could lure sane users away,
I increasing the premi_ for those remaining under the group policy
or leaving the Gove_t to pay some portion of the group policy
costs. User self-insurance is not viable ur_ess there is a
I substained population of users who regularly use the launch
i system. One can not expect use Is, who make infrequent use of the
launch system to agree to pay a portion of 1_labilitydamages of
1 _ an°t_r user's launch"
%
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I _he remaining alternatives appear, at least on the surfaoe,
to be viable. They seem to hold the potential for meeting the
I specified objectives, and they provide some protection to the
i Treasury against losses that it could incur without such
pr_ision.
I 6.2 _ Of _ Fr_mh*m _heckde
Given any of the above organizational structures, it
i remains to determine premium schedules for Federally provided
i insurance.
The structuring of am insurance premium schedule for
I Federally provided third-party liability insurance could seek to l
accomplish several objectives, such as the following:
I. It should be designed to promote, not inhibit commercial
i space activities.
2. Its conditions should not be subject to interpretation
i or negotiation.
3. It should not interfere with the provision of third-party
I liability insurance from commercial insurance sources. :
4. It should not impose a burden on the United States Trea- .,
sury.
I It would be all too easy to structure a premit_ schedule
that would inhibit cc_mercial space activities. For example, if
Federal premiums were substantially lower than commercial (
insurance_ premitm_, but were available only to certain qualified
users, it could force potential space users to engage in a
I lengthy approval process, thereby delaying or preventing
altogether the activity. On t/m other hand, premiums that are
high in relaticn to other costs of the activit? could present a
A 113
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II barrier. A premium of, say,.$i00,000 my be negligible to a user
launching a $50 million cx,_mun/cationsatellite, with a total
laumch cost in excess of $30 million. But to a user with a very
small payload, say a $200,000 box with a $I00,000 launch cost, a
| $i00,000 insurance premium could be devastating. The premium
!
structure should not inhibit potential user_ with very small
I payloads.
To facilitate the rapid approval of Federally provided
I insuranoe, the provisions of that insurance should be laid out as
clearly and conczsely, and subject to as little interpretation or
negotiation, as possible. If, to accumodate the insurance of
small payloads, premiums are to vary with payload size, then
such variation should be based, to the maximum extent possible,
on _jective and easily measured parameters. Payload cost or
financial status of the activity are not good measures. Both are
subject to a wide range of "interpretation" and are subject to
variabilities in accounting practices. Also, the administrative
costs of using such parameters would be high. The Space Shuttle
launch fee, on the other hand, is an easily determined parameter :
i that is not subject to debate. It is simply the amount paid by
the user to the Federal Gove_t for launch services.
I premit,_ structure generate enough revenue to
The should
fully fund any claim paym_ hs that might have to be made, and it
should not prevent the insurance industry from continuing to
I provide insurance up to its capacity to do so. THUS, at least
for "larger" satellites, such as the PAM-D class communication
I _ satellites' the Federal insurance premium sh°uld be well ab°ve
,, I 114
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I
I current insurance industry premiums.
If the Federal Government uses a method similar to that used
I by the insurance industry for determination of rates, being sure
that any premium is well above the expected =lability, the _ateI
should be high enough to set aside reserves to make _yments
I against possible claims over a reasonably short time.
_he above objectives appear to be achievable using a
I carefully structured premium schedule. It is suggested that such
j a schedule could be based on the Space Shuttle users fee and set
so as not to c(_pete with the private insurance Lndustry, gi%__n
I its cu[rent rate structure.
I
J
I
[
I
I
I
115
1986008762-120
II 7. (I3N(X_SIONS AND REC_MM_ND_TIGNS
I Several practices and precedents associated with third-party
liability insurance in other industries may be used as a basis
I and rationale for st_ucturing the Federal approach to third-party
I liability insurance for space vehicle users. A precedent for
government commitment to indemnification of damages beyond
I C(mmercially available insurar_e may be found in the Price-
Anderson Act. Federal Acts, such as Price-Anderson and the
Federal Limitation of Liability _ct of 1851, limited private
_try liability, with the objective of _raging development
of the industry. Other Acts applying to liability caused by
i spills of oil and other hazardous substances have limited
liability and also established Funds to pay damages in excess of
the liability limits. One practice that may be useful, if the
Federal gove_t chooses to provide some portion of liability
insurance, is that of a_-anging coverage in layers.
] 'Bsasonableness of premiu,ns depends on one's per_tive.
Rates must be reasonable to the seller and the buyer, ot.herwise
I the two groups will not do business. An analysis of rates in
i other industries suggests it would not be inconsistent with
standard insurance industry practice if rates for s_ace liability
I insurance were to rise significantly (perhaps to $500,000 to
$i,000,000) if space liability insurance is considered a product
i line.
I __ Several criteria are suggested t° determine re_as°nableness
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I from user's point of view, but reasonableness is subjectivethe
and varies with the user. Rates that may be reasonable to one
I user could be unreasonably high to another. Current rates are
probably reasonable frQm many points of view but even they could
impede small ventures. An alternative to t_ government
determining w[_tber adequate insurance is available at reasonable
rates, would be for the govermnent to make available Federal
insurance as a back-up to commercial insurance and designed so as
not to cc_3ete with commercial insurance.
Several viable alternatives are available to the gove_t.
If structured correctly the provision of third-party liability
insurance through the Feck.ral gove_t could serve the goal of
promoting space c(mmercializaticrl, could be self-supporting and
would be highly unlikely to negatively impact the Treasury.
Because the 9._ liability is low (in the case of the Space
Shuttle estimated at $i0,000 per shuttle flight), the gove_t
is not likely to be in a situation which would cause a drain on
the Treasury. By charging a premium the government is putting
aside funds to cover any damages that might arise.
If the gove_t decides to provide third-party liability
insurance careful study should be devoted to consideration of the
structure and format of the Federally provided insurance. Onoe
steps are taken precedents will be locked in for the future a_
wrong decisions can be costly. Further study should focu._ on the
following:
* Impact of various premium rates on space commercialization.
* An evaluation of the irLsurance options available to the
9°re rrm_nt"
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II t The organizat_ of the entity that administers theinsurance.
I , Structure of the third-party liability pr(_,ision.
• Determination of a premium schedb _.
I Specifically it is r_ that an analysis be performed
I of a government entity set up to provide third party liability
insurance. The insurance options mentioned above should be
I evaluated and the organization and administration of the
government entity should be studied. Various premium schedules
I should be evaluated. The long term an_ s,Jortterm impact on both
I the private sector and the government should be ccnsider__.
I
I
I
I
I
r
,_, ll_
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ml_i_: Liability without proof of fault or
i negligence.
Qi:t_:J_{:_::A measure of the emw:_mt of irm_ which an insurance
i company is able or prepared to assume on particular risks.
Ins_er: An insurancecompanyset up by a co.any or
group of companies to insure their own risks or risks common to
I the group,
_ned _em_: Toe portion of a premium, which is the property of
I an ir_urance oompars,, base_ on the expired portion of the policyper od.
I _ _: Provide for reinsurers to pay ordy the amoumt ofany given loss in excess of the amount the primary insurer agrees
to retain.
I _¥_ __: A procedure by which insurance oompanies
reinsure risks on at. ind/¢idual basis, with a reinsurer having
the option to a_ept or decline each risE.
_3/_: Condition which creates o_ increases the chances of a
loss.
//i_: To provide financial _tion for losses.
_: A system under which individuals, businesses and other
organizations or entities, in exchange for of ofpayment
a sum,
mo_. (a premium), are guaranteed cmmpensation for losses
resulting from. certain perils under specified
conditions.
_/li_ _: Insurance covering the policy)x)Ider's legal
liability for injuries to other persons o_" damage to their
prqoerty.
_: Tne maximu_l amount of benefits that an ir_urer agrees to
I in the event of a loss.
pay
_ir_: A type or kind of insurance.
_X_:_: Groups of individuals, called syndicates (not insurance
companies), assuming liability through an underwriter. Each
individual independem.t/y and personally assumes a proportionatepart of tPe risk accepted _y th underwriter.
_: The basis on which an iP.suran_ claim is st_omitted and/or
p_id.
_*Source:SharingtheRisk, InsuranceInformationInstitute.
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Ratio: The percent_qe of premiums (usually earned premiums)
used to pay losses aridloss adjustment expenses.
1
Im._s _: An insurer's estimated liability for unpaid
insurance claims or losses that will have tc be paid in the
future.
L
: _ _ _: An incorporated insurance organization
owned by its policyholders.
t
I_: Failure to use the degree of care which a person of
reasonable prudence woald use under given or similar
• circumstances. A r_rsor, may be negligent by acts of omission or
commission, or both.
Net i_]PJ_VJ_/_ Pr_it or _: Statuat.ory underwriting profit
less (or loss plus) dividends to policy holders.
"i
_H_I/_: The sum remaining after all liabilities
are deducted frum all assets. Suns such as _id-in capztal and
- special voluntary reserves are als, included in this term. This u
surplus is an additional financial protection to polic,fholders in ,
the event a company suffers unexpected or catastrophic losses.
: In effect, it is the financia) base that permits a osmpany to ,_
:. sell insurance.
]_Q_I: An organization of insurers cr reinsurers through which
particular types of risk are underwritten with premiums, losses
_ and expenses s_red in agreed-upon amounts.
]_um: The sum paid for an insur_ioe policy. Net premiums
_- written represent premium income retained by insuranc_ companies,
di rect or after reinsurance transactions. Direct written
premiums are the amounts actually paid by policy holders.
]__/_IZa _._a_ig_: Also may be_ referred to as proportional ,reinsur nce. The amount of insurar_e, t_he premium and losses are
: shared by the primary insurer and the reinsurer in agreed
" i proportions.
Ra_: The cost of a given unit. of insurance, on which a pr_ur._
-_ is based, r
_: Assumption by one insurance conpany of all or part
• of a risk undertaken by another insurance cxm%_nny.
l B_h_Po_i_Ml: The amount of risk retained by an insurance company
and _ reinsured.
_]_.LLC_Y_ _: A method permitting, adjustment, s_ject to
" maximum m_d minimum limits, of the fJ/_/ prenium for a risk on
_. the basis of its own loss experi_]ce.
. I __ Risk: Tne c/%ance of ]oss. Also used to refer to the insured or 4;
-, I !20
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I to p_operty covered by a polie].
_a_._: Management of the varied risks to which a
I business firm or corporation might be subject. It invoi_sanalyzing all exposu es to gauge the pos i ili y of loss and
determining how to minimize lo6ses by such means as insurar_e,
reduction or elimination of risk or the practice of safety and
I security easu es.
Self-insuranoe: An arrangement through which some fi_'_s and
I individuals to all or a portion of their own losses. '
assume
Self-insurers often establish special funds for this purpose, and
purchase insurance to cover losses in excess of predetermined *
I amounts.
_: The legal proce_ by which an insurance company,
after payir_ a loss, seeks to recover the amount of the lossfrom anothe who is legally liable f r it. F
_: (I) A risk or part of a risk for which there is
not nomal insurance m_rket available. (2) Insurance written by
non--tied insurance oompanies.
I TO_: A wrongful act, resulting in injury or damage, on which a
civil action may be based. Does not apply to a breech of
contract.
_TJ_: A form of reinsurance agreement between insurance
I _es.
__%[K_: A contract of reinsurance setting forth the
o:nditions for zeinsuring a class or classes of insurance.
1 •i_ /_: A form of imsurance protection against losses
in excess of the amount covered by other liability insurance
policies; also protects the insured in many situations notc vered by the usual liability polici s.
_: _ condition in which not enough _surance is
I carried to cover the insurable value.
__3_: The process of selecting risks for insurance and
determining in what amounts and on what terms the insuranoe :
_m%any will accept the risk. .
_ Pr_ or _: The amount of money which ani_urance company gains or loses as a res l its underwritir_3
operations. A net gain or loss on underwriting operations
i represents a oompany's statutory uT_erwriting result les any&_ount it _maypay to its policyholders in the form of dividends.
_IeAIII_ P__: The portion of a premi[_ that a comparry has
__ c°lle_ued but has yet t° earn because the p°Iic_y still has
I unexpired time to run.
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I APPENDIX A
g LC_D_ OOMPARED WIT_ U.S. _ NAR%_
I
I _ will be a leadL_g force in satellite underwriting ,due
i to a number of recent developments, and its unique institutiun_! ,
a_rangements.
I First, as Lbe premium statistics show, London, in general
and Lloyd's in particular, are the worldwide centers for marine
I and aviation insurance. ."hefirst satellite insurance was placed
in the three Londcn aviation s3rndicates. London and Lloyd's, in
particnllar, have been involved with the development of satellite
J insurance and place the bulk of satellite liabilit%yinsurance. L
Lloyd's has not been _ to t_e vicissitudes of the world
j ur_erwriting cycle. In the mar_e area, they have been hit by
j declining risks of the_ worldwide snipping recession. Aviation
underwriting results ha-;ebeen poor due to the_financial woes of
j the airline industry. However, underwriters at Lloyd's were among ,
the first to recognize tf_ problem. Capacity has beech greatly
j :reduced in many probie_ areas. REinsurance has tightened and
i unprofitable business, particularly treaty business has been cut
back. TheSe steps were taken a full year before U.S. blsurance
I co_sani_ took similar steps. As such, m_ny n_rine syndicates ;k
can expect to be profitable in 1984 and 1985
In the underwriting cycle, the marine market is always the
[
first to turn, because it is smaller.
By structure m?_-qof the Llc_jd'smarine syndicates are also
] _ those most active in the aviation and satellite areas. This is
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I the result of historic d development.
Lloyd's reputation for flexibility innovation and
I underwriting flair is well deserved. With many developments
o_-iginatingat Lloyd's -- such as insurance in oil rigs m_ jets
--under t',_right set of circumstances Lloyd's might be able to
l develop a thriving satellite market.
Partly, Lloyd's innovation and flexibility is due to '.h(:
I specialization of _00 _dicates within the collective market_
Ll(_d's has leaders that specialize in certain t_es of insurance
W and the market will follow the recognized leaders. If two or
I three can agree on premium rates and terms and conditions for a
perticuiar risk, others often will follow suit and significant
! -capacity becumes available.
U.S. insurance_ c(_panies are expected to show a profit
I (overall) every year. The President and C airm_n of the
I nsurance, companies thus can be expected to make short term
decisions to satisfy stockholders and directors. Because marine
! .and aviation premiL_msare e small part of anv one company's book
i and hence a small part of the problem, if any, a marine .,department can usually avoid rash short term type acti(_s, but
I not always. ThUS while U.S. _arine departm_nts are not "closed
down" for bad results, they may become risk averse and stop
! :entertaining particular classes of the.business, due to the
i Lntense short te_m need for profit frQm management.
But Lloyd's, in contrast to U.S. campanies has a Lmique
I three year aCCOL_mti-gyear. Rathe_ than operating on a twelve
month basis, Lloyd's acts on a thirty-sixmonth basis. The final
I _ acc°unting f°r a givenyear is n°t made and determined fOr tw°
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years. This helps to even out the expected fluctuations in
experience, so that a bad loss and mn abnormal yeaz can be taken
in ,ormal stride. F_reover, if underwriters know they'_ had a
I bad year, they still have two years in which to demonstrate that
i they can take corrective actions. As a result, the Lloyd's
market w,hileopen to inn_ation, is also more open to considering
I risk. The Lloyd's market is far more receptive to chazging high
rates for tough risks that the U.S. inst_ance market will not
insure for any price. By its accounting method and its
i com[x_itiQn as special'_v syndicates, and its ability to spread
large amounts ot risk amongst all its ma_bers, Lloyd's is ideally
I suited fer high risk _ _city type accounts.
A3ded to these unique qualities of Lloyd's is a
I responsiveness to commeL_ial n__ds and a penchant for innovation
and for developing expertise. As such, Lloyd's is the center for
marine activities and aviation insurances and will for the
forseeable future set the terms ar_ conditions in t_he satellite
industry. One might expec_ various facilities in the U.S. to
offer limited capacity; these would be the largest aviation
| facilities and some of the more aggressive marine facilities.
However, in the present underwriting climate in the U.S.,
that is, with U.S. ccmpanies and reinsurers e_erjencing m_eard
of and tmpreceden-ted underwriting losses, there is little
I likelihood t/_t U.S. ir_surance c(_ra_nies will see space
I insurance, either I_hysical_age o[ liability as an attractive
opport_it3,. Tno_e U.S. cc _anies which do _ space _ an
I __ attractive area in which to commence insurance activities wiii be
I 124 ,
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I hampered in their efforts by a lack of reinsurance. They will
not be able to line up reinsurance treaties. As such, capacity
I which is available in the U.S. will be very small. A broker may
i have to talk to seven U.S. underwriters to get capacity of
$2,000,000. A broker in London on the other hand may approach
I three or four Lloyd's leaders and be able to line up
$I00,000,000.
!| Significant U.S. capacity perhaps could be gathered in one
: _ underwriting pool; however this capacity will not be forthc(_
without some evid_nce of premium volume and, most important/y,
profitable experience.
I
i
i
I
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